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ZOMBIE MORTGAGES, REAL ESTATE, AND THE
FALLOUT FOR THE SURVIVORS
David P. Weber*

INTRODUCTION
The first generally accepted reference to zombies occurred approximately in the 18th century BCE in the Epic of Gilgamesh.1 Now popularized, the concept of zombie has begun to infect legal scholarship.2
Capable of a surprisingly broad application to various legal doctrines,3 the
generally accepted definitions of zombie are along the lines of the undead, walking dead or living dead.4 In the context of foreclosures initiated
but not finalized, this description is surprisingly apt. Generally in these
situations a lender has initiated foreclosure proceedings and typically sent
notice of eviction to the borrower. However, sometimes the lender fails
to finalize the foreclosure because of a perceived defect in the mortgage,
a lengthy foreclosure process, or high holding costs including maintenance. In these circumstances the title to the property remains in the borrower’s name, and the corresponding property taxes, maintenance,
utilities, etc., continue to accrue against the borrower. Often the bor* Professor at Creighton University School of Law. The author would like to
thank Thomas J. Fitzpatrick, IV for his thoughtful comments and insights. The author
would also like to thank Erik Walser for his tireless research efforts.
1. See, e.g., THE EPIC OF GILGAMESH 54 (Maureen Gallery Kovacs trans., Stan.
Univ. Press 1989) (“I will knock down the Gates of the Netherworld, . . . and will let
the dead go up to eat the living! And the dead will outnumber the living!”);
ZOMBIEPEDIA, http://www.zombie.wikia.com/wiki/Zombies (last visited June 13,
2013) (identifying The Epic of Gilgamesh as the original reference to zombies, though
the text does not use the word zombie specifically); Adam Chodorow, Death and
Taxes and Zombies, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1207, 1210 (2013) (providing that the word
zombie appears to derive from Haitian voodoo traditions).
2. See generally, Chodorow, supra note 1, at 1207.
3. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Night of the Living Dead Hand: The Individual Mandate and the Zombie Constitution, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1699, 1701 (2013) (describing
a zombie constitution as a “soulless shadow of the real document”); see also Mireille
Hildebrandt, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction to Enforce in Cyberspace? Bodin, Schmitt,
Grotius in Cyberspace, 63 U. TORONTO L.J. 196, 197 n.1 (2013) (defining zombie bots
and zombie armies used in the commission of cybercrimes); David E. Pierce, Kansas
Oil and Gas Update, 19 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 335, 335 (2013) (mentioning “Perpetuities Zombies”); Chodorow, supra note 1 (analyzing the tax implications of
zombiehood).
4. Chodorow, supra note 1, at 1213.
37
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rower is already in a bankruptcy proceeding and is simply trying to escape
the property as cleanly as possible.5 It may be necessary to recognize that
in some instances the borrower should be able to move on freely from the
property, but at the same time care must be taken to ensure an equitable
distribution of the costs of that alternative. A pathway allowing the borrower total financial absolution may ultimately be just as problematic as
allowing the lender to maintain the status quo if it were to increase the
cost or decrease the availability of financing for certain communities.
With both homeowners and lenders unable or unwilling to maintain
the property, the longer a zombie mortgage is allowed to exist, the more
destructive and costly it becomes long term.6 In trying to get out from
under their mortgages, many borrowers have attempted to tender deeds
in lieu of foreclosure, compel the bank to finalize the foreclosure, or quit
claim any interest in the property back to the lender unilaterally.7 In
many cases the lender is specifically attempting to avoid the outcome of
holding title, and therefore none of these solutions have proven to be
entirely workable. Once the homeowner has been evicted or abandons in
the face of the threat of eviction, the property takes on zombie attributes
in that the right to reside thereon has ostensibly been killed off, but the
problems and costs the property generates live on in a zombie-like state
continuing to torment the borrower. This article advocates several borrower-focused solutions to the zombie mortgage problem. Some of the
proposed solutions jointly benefit the affected municipalities, allowing
borrowers to co-opt the interests of the municipalities and jointly pursue
these types of relief. The article also acknowledges the reality that some
of the proposals will require buy-in from the lender community if they
are to become widely adopted. By aligning the interests of certain constituencies, there are promising potential solutions to the zombie mortgage
problem which would lessen the amount of time properties are vacant or
abandoned. These solutions would limit the corresponding economic
harm to each and ideally represent a Pareto optimal solution that even
lenders could support. Although the best solution would be one that ben5. See In re Heck, No. 09-31512, 2011 WL 133015, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Jan.
13, 2011) (seeking relief from HOA fees accrued post-bankruptcy as a result of zombie title).
6. See generally Raymond L. Pianka, Zombie Mortgages and Zombie Titles,
CLEV. MUN. CT. HOUS. DIV., http://clevelandhousingcourt.org/zombies.html (last visited July 22, 2013) (describing zombie mortgages and their consequences).
7. In a deed in lieu of foreclosure setting, borrowers may be able to convince the
lender to accept a deed to the disputed property in exchange for the lender forbearing
on its rights to foreclose. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). By granting a
quitclaim deed, the owner of record transfers any interest the owner has in the property to the grantee without warranty. Id.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMX\45-1\NMX105.txt

Fall 2014]

unknown

Seq: 3

14-JAN-15

ZOMBIE MORTGAGES, REAL ESTATE, AND THE FALLOUT

12:42

39

efits lenders, borrowers, and municipalities, potential solutions that benefit two of those three constituencies with minor harm to the third should
also be strongly considered.
Part I of this Article will briefly explain the context and scope of the
problem, how it typically arises, and how the problem was exacerbated by
the larger real estate crisis in the latter half of the 2000s. Zombie properties are problematic for the affected homeowners, but in many cases they
are equally problematic for other individuals residing in the same neighborhood, the lenders and servicers, and the relevant municipalities who
will have to face issues of negligence, blight and vandalism related to vacant properties. Part I will analyze current municipal approaches to dealing with the problem, primarily through vacant property registration
ordinances (VPROs). In the search for a solution to this crisis, both lenders and borrowers will likely need to share in the financial responsibility
for these properties. Part II will examine cases from both municipaldriven litigation as well as consumer-driven litigation where zombie debt
has been legally extinguished. Part II will also examine several bankruptcy decisions that potentially lead to an avenue of relief for the owners
of the affected properties. Part III proposes two new unique ordinances
that cities could use to combat the problem, highlights owner-based solutions in bankruptcy, and mentions other attempts that have been tried in
erasing zombie mortgages. This article concludes that a compromise solution that involves the municipalities, lenders and borrowers is the best
route to ease the nationwide problems associated with zombie mortgages.
I. THE WALKING DEAD
A. Assessing the Problem
In March, 2013, RealtyTrac reported 301,874 “zombie” properties
where the owners had vacated the property and the lender had failed to
foreclose.8 In some cases the owners walked away from their homes still
unaware that the title remained in their name, and that they were responsible for taxes and other bills related to the property.9 In some of those
cases, the homeowners had received a notice from the lender of a
planned foreclosure sale which would occur.10 For those homeowners who
were initially unaware or did not care about the incomplete foreclosure,

8. Barbara Liston, More than 300,000 homes are foreclosed “zombies,” study
says, REUTERS (Mar. 28, 2013, 4:59 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/28/ususa-housing-zombies-idUSBRE92R0YQ20130328.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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many were surprised to find themselves billed for past due taxes, securing
the structure, graffiti removal, demolition, trash removal, utilities, lawn
and garden care, etc.11 The problem rose to such a level that some towns
took measures to pass laws that could lead to the homeowners serving
time in jail if they were to fail to bring their properties into compliance
with the municipal ordinances.12
One of the primary reasons banks are unwilling to complete foreclosures in the current market is carrying costs. Especially in a market saturated with foreclosed properties, banks are looking at longer holding
periods and the increased costs associated with longer term ownership
including taxes, insurance and maintenance.13 Whereas borrowers have
been looked at as morally dubious for strategically defaulting,14 lenders
have been engaged in ironically similar fashion in initiating foreclosures
and then walking away at some point prior to the sheriff’s sale to avoid
the increased costs of ownership,15 oftentimes at great expense to the borrower and community.16 By walking away, banks take advantage of insurance, tax and accounting benefits from the monetary loss without the

11. Id.
12. Id.; see infra Part I.B.
13. See Ilyce Glink, “Zombie” foreclosures hit ex-homeowners, MONEYWATCH
(Apr. 2, 2013, 2:31 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505145_162-57577375/zombieforeclosures-hit-ex-homeowners.
14. See generally Brent T. White, The Morality of Strategic Default, 58 UCLA L.
REV. DISC. 155 (2010) (discussing the moral merit behind strategically defaulting);
Sean Lowe, Their Legality and Immorality: Pro Se, Strategic Foreclosure Defense
Lawsuits, 41 REAL EST. L.J. 172 (2012) (addressing the morality behind strategic
defaults).
15. See generally The Need for Policy Tools to Address Lienholder Walkaways
and Certain Vacant and Abandoned Properties: Hearing on H.B. No. 323 Before the H
House and Urban Revitalization Comm., OH. House of Representatives (2009) (statement of Thomas J. Fitzpatrick IV, Economist, Office of Policy Analysis of Fed.
Reserves Bank of Cleveland) (noting reason behind bank walkaways); Stephan Whitaker & Thomas J. Fitzpatrick IV, Deconstructing distressed-property spillovers: The
effects of vacant, tax-delinquent, and foreclosed properties in housing submarkets, 22 J.
HOUSING ECON. 79, 80, 88 (2013) (describing cases of selective foreclosures by creditors); see also, Pino v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 57 So. 3d 950, 951-52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2011) (showing a claim that the foreclosing bank held neither the note nor the
mortgage).
16. Michelle Conlin, Special Report: The latest foreclosure horror: the zombie title,
REUTERS (Jan. 10, 2013, 1:58 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/10/us-usaforeclosures-zombies-idUSBRE9090G920130110. In one especially distressing case,
an individual discovered that he was ineligible for social security disability benefits
because of the home that remained in his name and would therefore be unable to
obtain a needed liver transplant. Id. In at least three states, abandoned zombie homes
have exploded because gas lines were never shut off. Id.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMX\45-1\NMX105.txt

Fall 2014]

unknown

Seq: 5

14-JAN-15

ZOMBIE MORTGAGES, REAL ESTATE, AND THE FALLOUT

12:42

41

financial obligations of ownership, and it allows them to market the outstanding debt to collectors whether or not the borrower resides in a nonrecourse state.17
While foreclosure procedures are governed by state law and therefore vary from state to state,18 the procedure through which these zombie
mortgages come to life is generally very similar. States generally follow
two methods in regulating foreclosures: judicial foreclosure and non-judicial foreclosure by power of sale.19 Both processes contain certain safeguards and requirements, and both generally require the lender to
provide notice to the borrower at some point in the proceeding.20 Typically, notice will be given after a grace period for a missed payment (or
even several missed payments) has passed.21 After three months of delinquency a lender will generally begin to take some action.22
In a judicial foreclosure state, the lender will file a lawsuit and the
borrower will be served process. Only after the property is sold at auction, typically several months after the lender received judgment on the
lawsuit, will the sheriff serve the eviction notice and transfer the title in
the property to the purchaser at auction. Until the auction however, the
title remains in the borrower’s name, and the lender may unilaterally halt

17. Id.
18. David R. Greenberg, Neglected Formalities in the Mortgage Assignment Process and the Resulting Effects on Residential Foreclosures, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 253, 261,
265 (2010-2011); see also In re Townsville, 268 B.R. 95, 118 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2001)
(affirming state law governs foreclosure of real property).
19. See JOHN RAO ET AL., NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, FORECLOSURES
104 (3d ed. 2010) (outlining foreclosure methods). Two less common methods include
strict foreclosure and foreclosure by entry and possession, though neither will be discussed herein. Id.
20. Id. (setting forth notice requirements for both judicial and non-judicial foreclosures). States vary in notice obligations, requiring anything from notice by mail to
notice via registered mail, service of process and/or public notice. Id. Some states do
not even require personal service of the foreclosure notice on the borrower. Id. at n.
9.
21. Nanci L. Weissgold & Morey E. Barnes, Make My Day: States Dare Servicers
to Foreclose, K&L GATES: MORGTAGE BANKING & CONSUMER CREDIT ALERT 1, 2
(Nov. 2008), http://www.klgates.com/files/tempFiles/cdf0317d-6771-4c47-a925-577197f
98eb4/11_04_08_Mortgage_Bank_Alert.pdf.
22. Id.; see also Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Timetable, ILLINOIS LEGAL ADVOCATE, http://www.illinoislegaladvocate.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.dsp_content&
contentID=4945 (last updated May, 2006) (outlining foreclosure timetable); FED.
HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, AN OVERVIEW OF THE HOME FORECLOSURE PROCESS 5–6
(2011), http://fhfaoig.gov/Content/Files/SAR%20Home%20Foreclosure%20Process_
0.pdf.
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the proceedings at any time.23 Similarly, in non-judicial foreclosures or
powers of sale, the lender will generally serve the borrower a demand for
payment.24 After the required time period has passed, either by law or the
mortgage, a deed of trust will be used to convey the property temporarily
to a trustee who will sell the property at auction.25 As with judicial foreclosure, the lender can halt the proceedings unilaterally. Typically, with
non-judicial foreclosures, the title remains in the borrower’s name until
transfer to the trustee.26
With zombie mortgages, the lender often initiates the first step or
steps after default by the borrower on the note. The lender generally provides notice to the borrower which may include a demand to vacate the
premises.27 At some time thereafter and prior to the sheriff’s sale, the
lender ceases any attempt to finalize the foreclosure. This is lawful conduct, and generally the lender is under no obligation to provide notice to
the borrower that it is not actively completing the foreclosure process.28
Many of the borrowers, upon receiving notice of foreclosure and/or a notice of eviction, improperly assume the title to the property has long since
passed to the lender or a third party until they are served with default tax

23. See generally CALIFORNIA COURTS: THE JUDICIAL BRANCH OF CALIFORNIA,
http://www.courts.ca.gov/1048.htm (last visited June 19, 2013) (describing options
available to stop foreclosure); FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, supra note 22, at 14–15 (providing avenues for halting a foreclosure).
24. See Joseph E. Gotch Jr., Creditors’ vs. Debtors’ Under Alaska Foreclosure
Law: Which Way Does the Balance Swing?, 14 ALASKA L. REV. 77, 85–89 (1997).
25. See PROPERTY RADAR, http://www.propertyradar.com/foreclosure-guides/
foreclosure-101/non-judicial-foreclosure-process (last visited June 19, 2013) (outlining
non-judicial foreclosure process).
26. FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, supra note 22, at 14.
27. See U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n v. Guillaume, 38 A.3d 570, 584 (N.J. 2012) (establishing statutory obligation of lender to provide notice to borrower).
28. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-93, ADDITIONAL MORTGAGE
SERVICER ACTIONS COULD HELP REDUCE THE FREQUENCY AND IMPACT OF ABANDONED FORECLOSURES 1–2 (2010), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1193
.pdf; Conlin, supra note 16; but see OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY,
OCC 2011-49, GUIDANCE ON POTENTIAL ISSUES WITH FORECLOSED RESIDENTIAL
PROPERTIES, available at http://www.occ.gov/static/news-issuances/bulletins/rescinded/
bulletin-2011-49.pdf (providing guidance that requires OCC-supervised entities acting
as mortgage services to provide certain disclosures in the event the foreclosure process is interrupted), replaced by, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY,
OCC 2013-20, available at http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/bulletins/2013/bulletin2013-20.html; Other Real Estate Owned, Comptroller’s Handbook 16 (September
2013), http://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/comptrollers-handbook/
a-oreo.pdf (highlighting that the lender should “notify or attempt to notify, the borrower of the decision [to forego foreclosure and release the lien]”).
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notices or arrested for outstanding warrants related to the failure to
maintain the property.29
The problem of zombie mortgages may ease somewhat with an improving economy; however, even with improvement, it is estimated that it
would take over five years to clear the current foreclosure inventory in
judicial foreclosure states and nearly three years in non-judicial states.30
Given that foreclosures will continue to occur and that municipalities,
borrowers and homeowners near zombie properties continue and will
continue to face these issues into the foreseeable future, workable solutions are needed that will allow all parties to move on.
B. Vacant Property Registration Ordinances
States and municipalities have enacted many laws and ordinances,
respectively, to combat the problem of vacant properties.31 One of the
primary tools used to combat the problem is a vacant property registration ordinance (VPRO),32 which requires lenders to register vacant
properties upon the occurrence of certain triggering events.33 Generally
speaking, a VPRO requires an owner, lender, or servicer, as the case may
be, to register a property as vacant with the municipality, pay a corresponding fee, and agree to abide by certain code and maintenance re-

29. See, e.g., Creola Johnson, Fight Blight: Cities Sue to Hold Lenders Responsible
for the Rise in Foreclosures and Abandoned Properties, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1169, 1234
(2008) (discussing fallacious borrower assumption that title passed to lender); Susan
Saulny, Banks Starting to Walk Away on Foreclosures, N.Y. TIMES, (Mar. 29, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/30/us/30walkaway.html?_r=2&; Conlin, supra note
16.
30. See Steve Cook, Real Estate: Nothing to fear from zombie houses, UPI.COM
(April 2, 2013, 5:26 PM), http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Real-Estate/2013/04/02/
Real-Estate-Nothing-to-fear-from-zombie-houses/2381364937924 (noting in some
states it would take decades under the current legal regime to process all the
foreclosures).
31. Vacant Property Registration, MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSOCIATION, http://
www.mortgagebankers.org/VacantPropertyRegistration.htm (last visited June 15,
2013). A vacant property may or may not be a zombie depending on the circumstances and knowledge of the parties. See Zombie Titles, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www
.investopedia.com/terms/z/zombie-titles.asp (last visited June 20, 2013) (defining zombie titles).
32. See Dan Immergluck, Yun Sang Lee & Patrick Terra, Local Vacant Property
Registration Ordinances in the U.S. – An Analysis of Growth, Regional Trends and
Some Key Characteristics 1 (2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=2130775 (commenting on the explosive growth of VPROs beginning in
the early 2000s).
33. Id. at 7–8.
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quirements.34 Failure to comply with the VPRO framework may result in
fines and potential jail time.35 Much has been written regarding VPROs,
their importance, and their efficacy,36 but there is a dearth of literature
focusing specifically on the problem owners/borrowers have with zombie
mortgages which is related to, but quite different from, the vacant property issue.
In the VPRO literature, there is a focus on two main types of statutes, the “classic model,” which regulates all vacant property regardless
of the reason for the vacancy, and the “foreclosure model,” which only
covers those properties that are in some stage of the foreclosure process.37
Classic model ordinances would cover properties left vacant because a
rental property ceases to have a tenant, or those where the homeowners
moved into a new home and are attempting to sell the original, as well as
those properties that are vacant because the foreclosure process resulted
in an eviction of the previous owners.38 In many of the latter cases, the
home becomes property of the lender and is known in the trade as real
estate owned (REO) property.39 In contrast, as set forth by the ordinances, foreclosure model regulations do not apply to a property unless
the foreclosure process has been initiated.40
This article focuses exclusively on the foreclosure model or the foreclosure aspect of the hybrid model since zombie mortgages generally only
result from an incomplete foreclosure process. In this context, much of
the previous literature focusing on VPROs, and specifically the foreclosure model, structure their analysis around the more general question of

34. See, e.g., MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSOCIATION, supra note 31 (describing general requirements of vacant property registration ordinances).
35. Immergluck, Lee & Terra, supra note 32, at 7–8.
36. See, e.g., Joseph Schilling, Code Enforcement and Community Stabilization:
The Forgotten First Responders to Vacant and Foreclosed Homes, 2 ALB. GOV’T L.
REV. 101, 103 (2009); Timothy A. Davis, A Comparative Analysis of State and Local
Government Vacant Property Registration Statutes, 44 URB. LAW. 399 (2012); Immergluck, Lee & Terranova, supra note 32.
37. Immergluck, Lee & Terranova, supra note 32, at 7-8.
38. See CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE OF CHICAGO § 13-12-125(e) (2013) (providing
vacancy criteria); Davis, supra note 36 at 406-08; Schilling, supra note 36, at 130-32
(defining classic vacant property ordinance model).
39. See Real Estate Owned - REO, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/
terms/r/realestateowned.asp (last visited June 20, 2013) (defining REO property).
40. Immergluck, Lee & Terranova, supra note 32, at 8 (noting that, depending on
the jurisdiction, the foreclosure model is typically triggered by one of the following
events: notice of default, intent to foreclose, or the initiation or advertisement of the
commencement of the non-judicial foreclosure process).

R
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whether VPROs are desirable and/or effective.41 In answering these questions, the authors generally take into account three primary constituencies: lenders, municipalities, and the local communities.42 Certainly there
is much tension between lenders and municipalities regarding the appropriate manner in which to share costs of maintaining the vacant property,
and the extent of the burden to be imposed on the party maintaining the
property.43 Also important to recognize is the ancillary problem faced by
other property owners in near proximity to the vacant property. Studies
have shown the deleterious financial effects of having a vacant property
nearby in terms of property value depreciation, crime, and safety concerns dealing with the vacant property, including fire risk.44
As discussed in Section I.C. below, foreclosure model VPROs are
beginning to address the municipality and community constituencies by
requiring the lender to absorb greater financial responsibility for a property once foreclosure proceedings have begun,45 yet they have not addressed the problem faced by the evicted or abandoning homeowner who
is unable to escape the financial burden of the note or enjoy possession of
the premises.46 Undoubtedly focus has been placed on the municipalities,
communities, and lenders as they are most often the parties dealing with
the aftereffects of the abandoned property, or given the fact that the defaulting owner is not seen as a source of solution given the owner’s insolvency or abandonment of the property. Yet, in many instances, the
owners are left with little or no legal recourse to settle the issue and move
forward.

41. See generally Davis supra note 36 (identifying the advantages and disadvantages of VPROs); Benton C. Martin, Vacant Property Registration Ordinances, 39
REAL ESTATE L.J. 6 (2010) (discussing VPROs and their effectiveness).
42. See Martin supra, note 41; see also Immergluck, Lee & Terranova, supra note
32 (outlining lenders, municipalities, and local communities as the primary
constituencies).
43. Compare MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSOCIATION, supra note 31 (discussing
lender perspective and resulting burden), with Immergluck, Lee & Terranova, supra
note 32, at 5–7 (presenting the negative municipal impact rectified by VPROs). Typically the question arises as to how secure the property needs to be (i.e., plywood
versus metal over doors and windows), how often the property needs to be examined,
how to respond to complaints and maintenance requests, etc. See Immergluck, Lee &
Terranova, supra note 32, at 3 (presenting dispute over vacant property maintenance
requirements).
44. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 29, at 1181–83.
45. See infra Part I.C.
46. See generally Johnson, supra note 29.
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C. Foreclosure Model/Zombie VPROs
Many VPROs are predicated on the idea that well-maintained and
occupied homes deter criminal activity, ensure more stable communities
and property values, and provide more predictable tax revenue.47 Analysts have attempted to monetize the issue, and have reported on staggering costs due to unoccupied property in the form of casualty from fire,48 a
high correlation to crime,49 city-paid demolition costs,50 and reduced
property values.51 These high costs are directly borne by the municipality
and neighbors who were not parties to the real estate transaction that
gave rise to the zombie mortgage. Thus it is unsurprising that the unstated
but unequivocal goal of the municipalities in enacting these VPROs is a
cost-shifting mechanism that places at least some of the associated financial burden on a more solvent party.52 Equally unsurprising is that lenders
generally oppose this type of approach.53

47. See Schilling, supra note 36, at 104, 111 (explaining the traditional “Broken
Windows Theory” and the challenges presented by community instability due to unoccupied homes, and the substantial costs presented by a declining tax base).
48. Id. at 11 (citing Nat’l Vacant Props. Campaign, VACANT PROPERTIES: THE
TRUE COST TO COMMUNITIES 11 (2005) (noting annual losses over $70 million due to
fire)).
49. Nat’l Vacant Props. Campaign, supra note 48, at 3 (finding abandoned properties as the more predicative indicator of crime in a survey of various economic and
demographic variables).
50. Id. at 5 (noting that St. Louis had more than $15 million in demolition expenses over five years to deal with vacant properties).
51. Researchers from Philadelphia in 2001 documented significant declines in
property values for properties in close proximity to vacant properties as measured by
150 foot intervals. Id. at 9 (citing TEMPLE UNIV. CENT. FOR PUB. POLICY & E. PA.
ORG. PROJECT, BLIGHT FREE PHILADELPHIA: A PUBLIC-PRIVATE STRATEGY TO
CREATE AND ENHANCE NEIGHBORHOOD VALUE (2001), available at http://astro.tem
ple.edu/~ashlay/blight.pdf).
52. Even in cases where a municipality forecloses on a tax lien outside the zombie
mortgage setting, it is likely to receive only pennies on the dollar at a sheriff’s sale
given the underlying financial difficulties that prompted the homeowner to vacate the
property in the first place. See Sandra Livingston, Bank ‘walkaways’ from foreclosed
homes are a growing, troubling trend, CLEVELAND.COM (July 19, 2009, 6:33 PM), http:/
/blog.cleveland.com/metro/2009/07/bank_walkaways_from_foreclosed.html (indicating lenders receive as low as 15% of a property’s former value at a sheriff’s sale due to
malignant preexisting conditions); see also Kate Berry, Banks Halting Foreclosures to
Avoid Upkeep, AMERICAN BANKER (Apr. 23, 2013, 2:04 PM), http://www.american
banker.com/issues/178_78/banks-halting-foreclosures-to-avoid-upkeep-1058558-1
.html?zkPrintable=1&nopagination=1 (explaining the economical infeasibility of foreclosing for lenders, in part because the cost of back taxes and bringing the house up to
code exceeds the proceed amount).
53. MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSOCIATION, supra note 31.
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The Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) has stated, “[VPROs]
will further deteriorate the mortgage market by placing unreasonable requirements upon servicers.”54 The classic argument is that vacant property requirements will increase lenders’ cost of business and therefore
require them to restrict lending in communities with VPROs.55 It does not
appear, however, that Los Angeles for example, a city which has enacted
a VPRO, is now facing a dearth of lenders willing to finance real property
purchases.56
A better, more formalistic argument, based on contract and property rights is that lenders providing the money to purchase the property
were never the owners of record. While those lenders may have taken a
security interest, secured parties are not required to foreclose on the collateral and can freely elect to abandon the collateral they once deemed
sufficient.57 However, while that argument may prevail in localities without VPROs, the amendments to the law adopted by the VPROs would
abrogate those more general common law principles.
The next section will explore in greater depth the ordinances that a
few cities have enacted, mainly those that started earlier or took more
aggressive stances, which have received the vast majority of the news coverage and legal action.58 Chicago, IL,59 Chula Vista, CA,60 Cleveland,

54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Alejandro Lazo & E. Scott Reckard, Banks are starting to lend more freely,
L.A. TIMES, (June 22, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jun/22/business/la-fimortgage-credit-20130622.
57. See, e.g., TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.601 (West 2005) (indicating that
while secured parties have a right to foreclose on collateral they are not required to
do so).
58. Additionally, prominent towns such as Aurora, CO, Tampa, FL, Oakland, CA,
Miami, FL, Long Beach, CA, Fresno, CA, Riverside County, CA, Detroit, MI, Jacksonville, FL and many others have also enacted similar ordinances. See, e.g., AURORA,
COLO., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 22-641 (2009); TAMPA, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES
§ 19-131-139 (2009); OAKLAND, CAL., OAKLAND MUN. CODE § 8.54.010-.620 (2012);
MIAMI, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 10-61-69 (2008); LONG BEACH, CAL., LONG
BEACH MUN. CODE § 18.24.010-.100 (2011); FRESNO, CAL., MUN. CODE § 10-620
(2008); RIVERSIDE CNTY., CAL., ORDINANCE NO. 15.88.010-.090 (2005); DETROIT,
MICH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 9-1-50 (2010); JACKSONVILLE, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 179.101-.109 (2010).
59. See, e.g., CHI., ILL., CHI. MUN. CODE § 13-12-1251-28125-128 (2011); Antonio
Olivo, Dahleen Glanton & William Mullen, Bankers draw fire for letting Englewood
homes become magnets for crime, CHI. TRIB., (July 22, 2011), http://articles.chicagotrib
une.com/2011-07-22/news/ct-met-englewood-banks-20110722_1_foreclosure-case-fore
closure-auction-foreclosure-proceedings; Mary Ellen Podmolik, More banks walking
away from homes, adding to housing crisis, CHI. TRIB., (January 13, 2011), http://arti
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OH,61 Las Vegas, NV,62 Los Angeles, CA,63 and Springfield, MA64 are
among the more prominent. The ordinances that the cities enacted generally have several shared characteristics: a definition of owner, homeowner
or responsible party that includes the mortgagee and/or someone who has
control over the premises.65 Alternatively, such ordinances may have a
separate provision imposing registration, maintenance and additional obligations specifically on the mortgagee;66 inspection requirements, requirements for a local agent, obligations that are triggered prior to the
lender taking title;67 and significant penalties for failure to comply borne,
at least in part, by the lender.68
In addition, even municipalities without VPROs are taking very active approaches in dealing with the problem.69 In Buffalo, for example,

cles.chicagotribune.com/2011-01-13/news/ct-biz-0113-walkaway—20110113_1_foreclo
sure-process-foreclosure-filing-servicers.
60. E.g., CHULA VISTA, CAL., MUN. CODE § 15.60.010-.120 (2007).
61. See, e.g., Clev. v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 98 Ohio St. 3d 514, 2013Ohio-1305; Clev. v. Ameriquest Mortg, Sec., Inc., et al., 621 F.Supp.2d 513 (N.D. Ohio
2009); Clev. v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co., et al., 571 F.Supp.2d 807 (N.D. Ohio 2008).
62. E.g., LAS VEGAS, NEV., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 16.33.010-.090 (2011).
63. See, e.g., L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE § 164.00-.09 (2010); People v. Deutsche
Bank Nat’l Trust Co., No. 11-460878 (Cal. filed May 4, 2011); Edvard Pettersson,
Deutsche Bank Settles Los Angeles ‘Slumlord’ Lawsuit, BLOOMBERG.COM (June 18,
2013, 10:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-18/deutsche-bank-settleslos-angeles-slumlord-lawsuit.html.
64. See, e.g., SPRINGFIELD, MASS., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 7.50-.60 (2011); Easthampton Sav. Bank v. Springfield, 874 F.Supp.2d 25 (D. Mass. 2012).
65. See PROPERTY MAINTENANCE CODE OF NEW YORK STATE, § 202 (Int’l Code
Council, Inc. 2010) [hereinafter PMCNYS] (defining owner of real property); see also
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 19, § 1226.1 (2010) (establishing the 2010
PMCNYS as the legal standard). The City of Buffalo contends that once a lender
sends a letter to a homeowner threatening eviction for default, the lender is beginning
to “assert some measure of control” over the property. See Michael Orey, Dirty
Deeds, BUSINESSWEEK.COM, Jan. 2, 2008, http://www.businessweek.com/stories/200801-02/dirty-deeds (asserting that lenders effectively assert a measure of control
through eviction threats).
66. See, e.g., CHI., ILL., CHI. MUN. CODE § 13-12-125-27 (2011); LAS VEGAS,
NEV., MUN. CODE § 16.33.010-.090 (2011).
67. See, e.g., LAS VEGAS, NEV., MUN. CODE § 16.33.010-.090 (2011).
68. See, e.g., PMCNYS, supra note 65, §§ 106-07 (establishing liability and pertinent penalties attributable to the lender/owner); CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE, supra note
66, § 13-12-126 (establishing liability and pertinent penalties attributable to the
lender/owner).
69. See, e.g., Task Force on Vacant & Abandoned Prop.,THE U. S. CONF. OF MAYORS (June 2008) [hereinafter MAYORS], http://www.usmayors.org/bestpractices/vacant
properties08.pdf (detailing the Buffalo, NY vacant property initiatives that include
enhanced policing and demolition); Summons and Compl. at 7, Buffalo v. ABN Amro
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prosecutors seek compliance from all parties involved on the lending side
and also threaten to place liens on the property, which would have the
effect of precluding the bank from easily unloading that property in a
subsequent transaction to a party who may have no desire to maintain it.70
Additionally, in 2005, the mayor of Buffalo pledged to demolish 5,000
vacant properties in the next five years.71 In Cleveland, lenders are put on
trial in absentia if they fail to show up in court.72 Both Buffalo and Cleveland have refused to allow a foreclosure to continue until the lender addressed code violations.73
In essence, with traditional code enforcement strategies or through
zombie VPROs, the municipalities are engaging in a shifting of financial
obligations. Oftentimes, as in the case of Detroit, the city itself is near
insolvent and incapable of properly addressing the problem.74 Furthermore, to the extent that cities enforce these new ordinances or pursue
even more exotic devices to police zombie properties, lenders are going
to continue to vociferously oppose them and delay any implementation
for as long as possible. For the homeowner then, the zombie mortgage is
a problem far from any truly functional resolution.75

Mortg. Grp. Inc., No. 2008002200 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008); see generally Joseph Petti,
REGIS. AND THE RE-EMPOW. OF THE BUFFALO HOUS. CT. (Partnership for the Public
Good 2009), http://www.ppgbuffalo.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/out-of-town-de
fendants.pdf (outlining current and proposed vacant property action in Buffalo, NY).
70. See Orey, supra note 65, at 2 (noting that the city is seeking compliance from
many lender-side parties including loan originators all the way up to the trusts who
securitize and resell the pooled loans).
71. See, e.g., MAYORS, supra note 69, at 26 (detailing the Buffalo, NY vacant
property initiatives that include enhanced policing and demolition); Kevin Jolly,
Abandoned houses still a plague on the city, TIME WARNER CABLE NEWS (Mar. 21,
2013, 6:14 PM) (detailing that as of March, 2013, the city had demolished over 4,600
homes at a cost of between $16,000-$20,000 per home).
72. MAYORS, supra note 69, at 26.
73. Id.
74. See Mich. To get $100M To Demolish Vacant Houses, CBS DETROIT (June 6,
2013, 7:07 PM), http://detroit.cbslocal.com/2013/06/06/mich-to-get-100m-to-demolishvacant-houses (indicating Detroit does not have the financial means to properly address problem).
75. Given that it is one of the most important parties in real estate financing, I
must note the impact and role of the Mortgage Electronic Registration System
(MERS) with regard to VPROs. MERS, a privately run property registry, was created
to allow for high volume transfers of mortgages and notes (securitized or otherwise)
by reducing the transaction cost of public recording. See generally David P. Weber,
The Magic of the Mortgage Electronic Registration System: It Is and It Isn’t, 85 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 239 (2011) (providing an in-depth analysis of MERS); see also Richard E.
Gottlieb, Litigation Concerns for the Compliance Professional Fall 2011 Update,
MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSOCIATION (Sept. 26, 2011), http://www.mortgagebankers
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D. State & Local Laws
1. Localities Take Action
As cited above, localities across the United States have begun to
enact sweeping ordinances to combat the blight, security risks, and financial harm brought about by vacant homes.76 As of March, 2014, over 1,000
localities have enacted some type of VPRO.77 The ordinances nearly universally require registration of the property based on the time of vacancy
or upon the filing of a notice of default rather than some later point such
as the start of judicial proceedings or the foreclosure sale.78 Oftentimes
the fees are progressive, meaning that the longer a property remains vacant, the greater the registration fees and possible fines become.79 The

.org/files/Conferences/2011/RegulatoryCompliance/RC11Gottlieb.LitigationConcerns
.pdf (outlining and defining MERS), About Us, MERS (Last visited October 12,
2014), http://www.mersinc.org/about-us/about-us (defining the basics and benefits of
MERS). MERS maintains a significant database for the mortgages and notes for
which it is the mortgagee, nominee or servicer of record. Id. The Mortgage Bankers
Association (MBA) would prefer to utilize MERS’ database to perform the role of
vacant property registration rather than a public registry. MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSOCIATION, supra note 31. Keeping the vacant property registration system within
MERS ensures that it will remain a private issue rather than a public one, and perhaps requiring greater oversight to ensure that borrowers are able to obtain all necessary information from MERS. Immergluck, Lee & Terra, supra note 32, at 9; see also
Gretchen Morgenson, Mortgtage Registry Muddles Foreclosures, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/02/business/fair-game-mortgage-registry-mud
dles-foreclosures.html?ref=mortgageelectronicregistrationsystemsinc&_r=0 (describing MERS as unreliable); Michael Powell & Gretchen Morgenson, MERS? It May
Have Swallowed Your Loan, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/03/06/business/06mers.html?pagewanted=all (detailing the unreliable nature of
MERS). Given the reported unreliability of the data, if the lender can satisfy the
VPRO information requirements by listing MERS as the mortgagee and/or agent to
contact, the owner may not actually receive the mandated information. Id.
76. See supra Part I.B-C.
77. Safeguard Properties maintains a thorough database of over 1,000 local
VPROs on their website. SAFEGUARD PROPERTIES, http://www.safeguardproperties
.com/Services/Property_Registration.aspx (last visited March 11, 2014).
78. Notable exceptions to the earlier time are Oakland, CA, which require registration when the property is sold at the foreclosure sale, and Aurora, CO, which require registration when the initial pleadings are presented in the judicial foreclosure
process. See OAKLAND, CAL., MUN. CODE § 8.54.010-.620 (2012); AURORA, COLO.,
CODE OF ORDINANCES § 22-641 (2009).
79. See, e.g., ALBANY, N.Y., CODE OF THE CITY OF ALBANY § 133A-3(B)(1)
(2011) (requiring progressive fees in $250-$500 increments for years one through
five).

R
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clear intent of this progressive system is to motivate the owner or responsible party to find inhabitants for the property as soon as possible.80
Many VPROs include detailed instructions for registration, maintenance requirements, demolitions plans, fines, and potential jail time for
failure to comply.81 These efforts, as mentioned above, are largely directed toward the problem of blight and safety, though city finances also
play a significant role. In addition to the traditional registration requirements, some cities have taken additional creative steps to combat the
situation.
In Chicago, for example, remedies available to the city include forfeiture, forced sale, or demolition. The Chicago Department of Housing
has the ability to work with the Chicago Law Department to force the
owner to either rehabilitate or transfer the property.82 Likewise, in Hackensack, New Jersey, the city has adopted a procedure that allows it, after
proper notice, to take possession of a property, rehabilitate it, and resell
it without becoming the owner of title.83 In Minneapolis, Minnesota, the
city established a fund to encourage the purchase of properties in a block
that has at least one foreclosed or vacant and boarded building. In exchange for a five-year, $10,000 forgivable loan, the buyer must live in the
home and go through a training program.84 Minneapolis and other cities
such as Detroit, Michigan and Louisville, Kentucky have also used land
banks85 (public or private), which allow property to pass to the land bank

80. See Martin, supra note 41, at 1, 9 (identifying one purpose of VPROs as discouraging vacancies).
81. See Arthur B. Axelson, Go Directly to Jail? Las Vegas Joins Other Jurisdictions in Imposing Burden of Upkeep of Vacant Properties on Lenders, DYKEMA (DEC.
8, 2011), http://www.dykema.com/resources-alerts-imposing-burden-of-upkeep.html
(describing content and requirements of VPROs and possibility of imprisonment for
noncompliance).
82. Overview of Municipal Vacant Building Registries, PARTNERSHIP FOR THE
PUBLIC GOOD (2010), http://www.ppgbuffalo.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/vacant
+property+registry+laws.pdf.
83. See MAYORS, supra note 69, at 22-23 (outlining vacant property procedures
for Hackensack, NJ).
84. See, e.g., id. at 18. In addition to this affirmative program, Minneapolis, charging $6,000 per year, enacted some of the country’s highest fees for registering vacant
properties. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 249.10-.90 (2012); Maya
Rao, Vacant Minneapolis properties are assessed huge annual fees, STAR TRIBUNE
(Aug. 8, 2012, 7:18 AM), http://www.startribune.com/local/minneapolis/165370756
.html?page=1&c=y. In addition to the registration fee, unpaid fees can be levied and
collected as a special assessment with 8% annual interest. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.,
CODE OF ORDINANCES § 249.60.
85. Land banks are generally non-profit or governmental entities designed to take
title to property to allow the land bank to rehabilitate the property or limit the num-
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and have its title cleared in order to rehabilitate the property or resell the
property to a new purchaser.86 Finally, St. Louis, Missouri has established
a “Problem Property Court” which has resolved thousands of warrants
regarding ordinance violations.87
All of these local ordinances provide invaluable services to the local
community, and, although they are perhaps unwilling to admit it, to the
lenders who hold mortgages on the vacant properties, as these measures
ultimately support property values in local real estate markets.88 A problem with the local approach, however, is the resulting patchwork of requirements and obligations that vary tremendously from locality to
locality.89 Given the potential problem of thousands of varying obligations, the mortgage industry has successfully begun to lobby for statewide legislation on the matter.90 The next section discusses several of the
laws and bills aimed at the vacant property problem. However, like the
municipality driven ordinances, the laws appear to be beneficial to the

ber of foreclosed properties on the market. See Schilling, supra note 36 at 117; see also
Frank S. Alexander, Land Banks and Land Banking, SMART GROWTH AMERICA,
19–21 (2011), http://www.smartgrowthamerica.org/documents/ccp_land_banks.pdf
(discussing the myriad benefits land banks can provide communities including by
clearing legal impediments to clear title). Problems inevitably result, however, when
land banks lack resources to acquire and/or maintain their inventory.
86. See, e.g., MAYORS, supra note 69 at 14; see also MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE
OF ORDINANCES § 249.10–.90 (2012); DETROIT, MICH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 9-150 (2010).
87. See, e.g., MAYORS, supra note 69, at 20-21; see also ST. LOUIS, MO., CODE OF
ORDINANCES § 25.01.010-.660 (2010); Problem Properties Unit, ST. LOUIS COUNTY.
MISSOURI, http://www.stlouisco.com/PropertyandRoads/NeighborhoodServices/
ProblemPropertiesUnit (last visited July 1, 2013).
88. By curtailing both the number of vacant properties and the amount of time
that properties remain vacant, the ordinances support the value of the property at
issue, and, perhaps more importantly for the municipalities, the property values of all
nearby properties. Supporting the property values maintains a robust municipal tax
base. In addition, many lenders, especially national ones, make numerous loans for
properties in the same vicinity. Removing vacant properties positively affects the
property values of those other properties on which they may hold a mortgage. See,
e.g., Whitaker & Fitzpatrick, supra note 15, at 91 (noting a 4.6% decrease in nearby
property values to homes that are vacant and tax delinquent and a 4.2% to 7.5%
decrease in value in high-poverty areas with vacant foreclosures that are tax-current).
89. Given this complexity, providing the maintenance support for these properties
has turned into a cottage industry. Safeguard Properties, one of the largest vacant and
foreclosed property managers in the United States, maintains a thorough database of
local VPROs on their website. Property Registration Ordinances, SAFEGUARD
PROPERTIES, http://www.safeguardproperties.com/Resources/Vacant_Property_Regis
tration.aspx (last visited March 11, 2014).
90. See infra Part I.E.2.

R
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communities that adopt them,91 and usually offer no benefit to the owner
of the property who often no longer resides on the property, who may
believe that the property is now owned by the bank, and who only wishes
to disassociate him or herself from the property.92
2. States Shuffle Forward
Since the 2000s, states have also begun to more actively regulate
foreclosures and vacant properties. Connecticut,93 Maryland,94 North Carolina,95 New York96 and others have proposed or enacted laws specifically
targeting foreclosure procedures and oftentimes vacant properties. In
many instances, these laws provide a general framework and municipalities are allowed to require heightened standards, though Connecticut appears to have done the opposite.97 The mortgage industry appears to
favor the statewide approach over the local as it allows it for greater uniformity and certainty for the lenders.98
Like their municipal counterparts, one of the principal components
of these laws is transparency. In Connecticut and Maryland, the legislatures have adopted vacant property registrations that allow the authorities to easily track properties purchased at foreclosure sales. In addition
91. Immergluck, Lee & Terra, supra note 32, at 10 (stating, “[t]hus far, no studies
have found negative impacts of VPROs on local housing markets”).
92. In fact, several of the laws create additional burdens on the owner. See, e.g.,
PMCNYS, supra note 65, §§ 301-704 (establishing additional responsibilities placed
on owner); CHI. MUN. CODE, supra note 66, § 13-12-126 (outlining requirements for
owners of vacant property); DYKEMA, supra note 81 (presenting burdens placed on
owner of vacant property).
93. CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 19-13-B25 (2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7148ii (West 2011). The Connecticut regulation is very limited in scope as the registration aspect only applies to those parties who have received title to a residential property through a completed foreclosure action. 2009 CONN. PUB. ACTS. 09-144 (Reg.
Sess.) available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2009/ACT/PA/2009PA-00144-R00SB-00951PA.htm. Furthermore, it allows registration with MERS in lieu of registration with a
public entity. Id.
94. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 7-105.1 (West 2012); H.D. 1373, 2012 Leg.,
430th Sess. (Md. 2012), available at http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2012rs/bills/hb/
hb1373e.pdf
95. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 45-100 to -107 (West 2008).
96. See PMCNYS, supra note 65, at § 202; see also N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS.
tit. 19, § 1226.1 (2010) (establishing the 2010 PMCNYS as the legal standard).
97. 2009 Conn. Pub. Acts. 09-144 § 2 (Reg. Sess.).
98. See generally, Michael Halpern Proposes “Top-Down, Bottom-Up” Approach
to Community Outreach, SAFEGUARD PROPERTIES, http://safeguardproperties.com/
News_and_Events/All_Client_Alerts/2012/04/Vacant_Property_Registration_Ordinan
ces.aspx (last visited October 14, 2014) (presenting benefits of a statewide v. local
ordinance approach).

R
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to the registration requirements, Connecticut and Maryland have also
adopted complex mediation provisions to ameliorate the foreclosure crisis.99 In Maryland, for example, the foreclosure period is 90 days post default, and also requires a detailed “Notice of Intent to Foreclose” be sent
to the borrower, record owner and the Commissioner of Financial Regulation within 45 days of the foreclosure.100 The notice must specifically
include an agent of the lender who has the authority to modify the terms
of the loan as well as a detailed accounting.101
The laws work to provide a negotiated settlement between the defaulting owner and the creditor. Requiring mediation, lender/servicer
contact information, and the ability to deal directly with an individual
authorized to modify the mortgage provides owners and lenders alike a
reduced cost pathway to keeping the property occupied and minimizing
the loss to the lender. The process is less useful, however, when the owner
lacks the financial wherewithal to make even modified payments.
In this regard as well, the state statutes dealing with vacant properties and foreclosure mediation are similar to the municipal ordinances in
that they do not regulate aborted foreclosure proceedings that result in
zombie mortgages. In many cases this is likely because the inconvenient
situation a borrower finds himself in following an abandoned foreclosure
process is not the type of ill the legislature was attempting to correct.
That being said, there are a few decisions across the United States that
provide more than a glimmer of hope for owners of properties encumbered by zombie mortgages.
II. JUDICIAL LANDSCAPE
In cities across the country, lawsuits have been brought challenging
the ability of the lender to remain in the shadows free of financial obligation to the property. The results are split, and in some jurisdictions that
uncertainty has resulted in settlement agreements rather than risking
litigation.102
99. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 49-31k (2011), amended by 2013 Conn. Pub.
Acts 13-136 (Reg. Sess.) available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2013/act/pa/pdf/2013PA00136-R00HB-06355-PA.pdf; H.D. 1374, 2012 Leg., 430th Sess. (Md. 2012) available at
http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2012rs/bills/hb/hb1374e.pdf (regulating pre and post-foreclosure filing mediation).
100. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 7-105.1 (West 2012).
101. Id.
102. See Docket at June 17, 2013, People v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust, No. BC
460878 (Cal. Superior May 4, 2011) (indicating filing of settlement notice); Edvard
Pettersson, Deutsche Bank Settles Los Angeles ‘Slumlord’ Lawsuit, BLOOMBERG.COM,
(June 18, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-18/deutsche-bank-settles-
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A. Municipality-Driven Litigation
The majority of the early zombie mortgage lawsuits focused on the
ability of the municipality to hold the lender financially responsible for
the state of the property.103 More recently though, homeowners have
sought relief from zombie mortgages on a variety of grounds including:
estoppel;104 analogizing the situation to a creditor’s improper refusal to
foreclose on a vehicle;105 soliciting an order of sale in a bankruptcy hearing;106 offering a deed in lieu of foreclosure;107 participating in a short sale

los-angeles-slumlord-lawsuit.html (confirming intent and proposal to settle); see also
City of Buffalo v. ABN Amro Mortg. Grp. Inc., No. 2008002200 (Erie Co., N.Y., Sup.
Ct. 2008) (remaining parties settled); Thom Weidlich, Foreclosures Prompt Four U.S.
Cities to Sue Banks for Mowing, Home Repairs, BLOOMBERG.COM (May 11, 2011,
11:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-12/foreclosures-prompt-four-us-cities-to-sue-banks-for-mowing-home-repairs.html (reporting remaining parties to
suit settled) Ellen Rosen & Elizabeth Amon, BofA, JPMorgan, Boeing, Galleon,
HealthSouth in Court News, BLOOMBERG.COM, (May 11, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-11/fcpa-verdict-galleon-drilling-healthsouth-tax-shelters-incourt-news.html (reporting banks strategy of settling to end investigation).
103. See Weidlich, supra note 102 (reporting municipalities judicial attempt to hold
lenders financially responsible for vacant property maintenance); e.g., ABN Amro
Mortg. Grp. Inc., No. 2008002200 (holding lenders responsible); Complaint at 10, City
of Minneapolis v. TJ Waconia, LLC, No. 27CVHC08-2728, 2008 WL 925273 (D.
Minn. 2008) (holding lenders responsible for vacant properties); City of Cleveland v.
Ameriquest Mortg. Sec., Inc., 621 F.Supp.2d 513 (N.D. Ohio 2009) (seeking relief for
vacant properties from lenders).
104. See, e.g., Complaint at 1, People v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust, No. BC 460878,
2011 WL 1663038 (Cal. Superior May 4, 2011) (establishing grounds for relief); see
also Dan Levine & Edward Taylor, Los Angeles Sues Deutsche Bank Over Foreclosure Blight, INSURANCE JOURNAL, (May 5, 2011), http://www.insurancejournal.com/
news/west/2011/05/05/197373.htm (describing homeowners estoppel claim); see also,
e.g., City of Memphis v. Wells Fargo, No. 09-2857-STA, 2011 WL 1706756 (W.D.
Tenn. 2011) (seeking relief from lenders based on estoppel related grounds); Baltimore v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 631 F.Supp.2d 702 (D. Md. 2009) (purporting relief
should be granted on grounds of estoppel).
105. See Canning v. Beneficial Maine, Inc. (In re Canning), 706 F.3d 64 (1st Cir.
2013) (citing Pratt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. (In re Pratt), 462 F.3d 14 (1st
Cir. 2006) (finding secured creditor’s refusal to foreclose an impermissible attempt to
coerce the payment of a discharged debt)).
106. See, e.g., In re Fristoe, No. 10-32887, 68 Collier Bankr.Cas.2d 1469, at *2–3
(Bankr. D. Utah Sept. 27, 2012) (requesting court issue order mandating lender complete foreclosure sale); see also Pigg v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP (In re Pigg),
453 B.R. 728, 729–730 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2011) (petitioning court for order requiring
lender to complete foreclosure process).
107. See, e.g., Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Young, No. 2009 CA 12, 2001-Ohio-122, at
¶ 5 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2011) (petitioning court for deed in lieu).
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if possible;108 and attempting to have liens stripped in bankruptcy
proceedings.109
Given their public persona, municipalities may have slightly more
tools at their disposal as they attempt to enforce maintenance requirements under standard ordinances and registration obligations under the
VPROs. In fact, cities have attempted several different approaches with
varying degrees of success. One trend has been for the city to sue lenders
on the ground of public nuisance,110 and another has seen cities suing
lenders for violations of the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), as shown in the
cities of Baltimore, Maryland,111 Birmingham, Alabama112 and Memphis,
Tennessee.113 These suits, like the VPROs, have provided the municipali-

108. See, e.g., Cleveland Hous. Renewal Project, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
934 N.E.2d 372, 377–378 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010) (discussing short sale requirements in
stalled foreclosure action).
109. See, e.g., In re Heck, No. 09-31512 TEC, 2011 WL 133015, at *1 (Bankr. N.D.
Cal. Jan. 13, 2011) (seeking to reopen bankruptcy case to have liens removed from
property); see also In re Fristoe, 2012 WL 4483891, at *2 (requesting court remove
liens from property in bankruptcy proceeding).
110. See, e.g., Easthampton Sav. Bank v. City of Springfield, 874 F.Supp.2d 25, 28
(D. Mass. 2012) (upholding a recently enacted foreclosure ordinance aimed at
preventing dangerous and hazardous conditions at vacant properties and properties in
the process of foreclosure); City of Cleveland v. Ameriquest Mortg. Sec., Inc., 621
F.Supp.2d 513, 516–517 (N.D. Ohio 2009) (dismissing public nuisance claim against
lender); Cleveland v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co., 571 F.Supp.2d 807, 810 (N.D. Ohio
2008) (alleging public nuisance claim against multiple lenders).
111. City of Baltimore v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Civil Case No. JFM-08-62, 2011
WL 1557759, at *1 (D. Md. 2011) (denying Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss FHA
claim for lack of a causal connection). See Luke Broadwater, Wells Fargo agrees to
pay $175M settlement in pricing discrimination suit, THE BALTIMORE SUN (July 12,
2012), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2012-07-12/news/bs-md-ci-wells-fargo-201207
12_1_mike-heid-wells-fargo-home-mortgage-subprime-mortgages (outlining terms of
settlement between Wells Fargo and Baltimore that includes a direct payment of $7.5
million to the city of Baltimore).
112. City of Birmingham v. Citigroup, Inc., No. CV-09-BE-467-S, 2009 WL
8652915, at *1 (N.D. Ala. 2009) (dismissing FHA and negligence claims for lack of
standing).
113. City of Memphis v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 09-2857-STA, 2011 WL
1706756, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. 2011) (denying Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss claim
based on “reverse redlining” and race-based violations of the FHA); see also James
O’Toole, Wells Fargo pledges $432.5M in lending, payments to settle lawsuit, CNN
MONEY (May 31, 2012), http://money.cnn.com/2012/05/30/news/companies/wellsfargo-memphis/index.htm (reporting Memphis ultimately settled by requiring Wells
Fargo to, among other things, pay the city $3 million to support economic development and provide $4.5 million in grants for mortgage down payments and home
renovations).
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ties with some direct remedies, but largely leave the homeowners little
recourse.114
Public nuisance claims are potentially problematic for the municipality given that ill-advised and even discriminatory lending practices
themselves may not cause the type of economic loss required in some
jurisdictions to maintain the claim.115 In City of Cleveland v. Ameriquest
Mortg. Sec., Inc.,116 the court concluded that the economic loss was suffered by the homeowner rather than the city and that “conduct which ‘the
law sanctions,’ [ . . . ] cannot be a public nuisance.”117 Thus public nuisance claims have not been a tenable solution.
On the other hand, municipalities have had significant success with
FHA claims as seen with the recent, large settlements reached with lenders and the cities of Baltimore,118 Los Angeles,119 and Memphis.120 In those
cases, the common denominator has been underlying improper lending
patterns and/or improper evictions and foreclosures. Because of the specifically pleaded improprieties and properties involved, the cities successfully avoided motions for dismissal and summary judgment and were
ultimately able to reach settlement. While these techniques are useful in
combating vacant and unmaintained properties, they generally provide
no avenue for relief for the borrower.
B. Borrower Litigation
1. No Requirement to Foreclose
Forces remained at work that could make [borrowers’] continued
ownership of the real estate uncomfortable—forces like accruing
real estate taxes and the desirability of maintaining liability insurance for the premises. But those forces are incidents of ownership.
Though the [Bankruptcy] Code provides debtors with a surrender
option, it does not force creditors to assume ownership or take possession of collateral[.]121

114. Cf. Broadwater, supra note 111 (noting Wells Fargo had agreed to direct payments to individuals who had suffered from its unlawful discrimination).
115. City of Cleveland, 621 F.Supp.2d at 521–26.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 531.
118. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
119. See James R. Hood, Bank of America Fined $1 Billion For Mortgage Fraud,
CONSUMERAFFAIRS (Feb. 10, 2012), http://www.consumeraffairs.com/countrywidenews.
120. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
121. Canning v. Beneficial Maine, Inc. (In re Canning), 442 B.R. 165, 172 (Bankr.
D. Me. 2011) (emphasis added).

R

R
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Bluntly stated, borrowers have had to resort to creative attempts to
successfully flee their zombie mortgages. In Canning v. Beneficial Maine,
Inc.,122 the First Circuit rejected attempts by a homeowner to argue that
failure to release the lien amounted to coercion to pay a discharged
debt.123 In Canning, the owners argued that their situation mirrored that
of the owner of an encumbered car who was unable to junk the essentially worthless car due to a security interest.124 The Canning court held
that the lender’s refusal to release the lien on the real property was not
based on subterfuge or an inappropriate attempt to coerce payment on
several grounds.125
The First Circuit, citing to the Bankruptcy Code,126 noted that even
though debtors may free themselves from a prepetition lien by surrendering the encumbered property to the creditor, “the secured creditor, however, has the prerogative to decide whether to accept or reject the
surrendered collateral.”127 So long as the secured creditor’s refusal to accept the collateral is not “subterfuge intended to coerce payment of a
discharged debt,” the creditor is free to walk away from the collateral.128
In holding there was no subterfuge, the court noted the property retained
significant value,129 the lender had solicited a settlement offer or short
sale from the owners, and the lender allowed the owners to occupy the
home.130
Although the owners failed in their petition to escape the lien in
Canning, the case presents a clear roadmap for other homeowners whose
homes do not retain significant value.131 If the encumbered property is
worthless or of very limited value, “the legitimate raison d’être for
the . . . lien no longer [applies].”132 Likewise, the Tenth Circuit has held
122. 706 F.3d 64 (1st Cir. 2013).
123. See id. at 68; see also Debtor Can’t Force Lender to Foreclose, 23 CONSUMER
BANKR. NEWS 8 (Mar. 12, 2013).
124. See Canning, 706 F3d at 68; see also Pratt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp.
(In re Pratt), 462 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2006).
125. Canning, 706 F.3d at 69–70.
126. Id. at 69; see 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2).
127. Canning, 706 F.3d at 69–70.
128. Id. at 70.
129. Id. at 66–67 (noting although the owners owed over $180,000, the lender valued the property at $75,000).
130. Id. at 71–72.
131. Though of course, this may still prove problematic with regard to postpetition
condominium fees and assessments. See, e.g., In re Ames, 447 B.R. 680, 684 (Bankr.
D. Mass. 2011) (holding debtor liable for postpetition condominium fees).
132. See Pratt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. (In re Pratt), 462 F.3d 14, 20 (1st
Cir. 2006); see also Casarotto v. Missouri Dept. of Revenue (In re Casarotto), 407
B.R. 369, 377–378 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2009) (determining that surviving lien “serve[d]
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the discharge injunction precludes otherwise permissible actions if they
are designed to “‘coerce,’ or ‘harass’ the debtor improperly,’” in an attempt to “obtain payment of the discharged debt.”133 The Tenth Circuit
identified the test as whether objectively the creditor’s failure to release
the lien had the “practical, concrete effect of coercing payment of a discharged debt, and bad faith is not required.”134 As discussed in Part B.2
below, in many scenarios where the homes are worthless or nearly so,
such as has occurred in the cities of Cleveland and Detroit among others,
Canning may ultimately come to be seen as the case that provided the
necessary legal support to borrowers seeking to escape their zombie
mortgages through bankruptcy.
2. Equitable Relief
The perfect storm of the ‘Great Recession’ and these unspeakable
natural disasters leaves debtors such as Mrs. Pigg and other victims
like her to suffer unbearable losses of their homes . . . and be denied the fresh start promised by bankruptcy. [These types of debtors] suffer a wrong without a remedy.135

In addition to the arguments based on subterfuge or coercion identified above, appealing for equity is also available in bankruptcy.136 In another case involving a zombie mortgage, the court used its equitable
powers to fashion an equitable remedy for the debtor. In the case Pigg v.
BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP,137 the lender, although refusing to foreclose or release its lien, had actively taken possession of uninhabitable
property.138 In Pigg, the borrower and Chapter 7 debtor was the owner of
title of a flood-damaged condominium unit that she had vacated and surrendered. As the Code does not discharge post-petition homeowners association (“HOA”) fees in Chapter 7,139 the debtor sought equitable relief
based in part on the fact the mortgagee had exercised control over the
property by excluding the debtor, changing the locks, and maintaining
a legitimate economic purpose”); In re Schlictmann, 375 B.R. 41, 97 (Bankr. D. Mass.
2007).
133. Paul v. Igelhart (In re Paul), 534 F.3d 1303, 1308 (10th Cir. 2008).
134. Id.
135. Pigg v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP (In re Pigg) 453 B.R. 728, 734 (Bankr.
M.D. Tenn. 2011); see also id. at n.11(noting the lender’s concession that the situation
“appears to be a case of a wrong without a remedy”) (emphasis added).
136. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2010) (“The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.”).
137. 453 B.R. 728 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2011).
138. See Pigg, 453 B.R. 728, 734; contra In re Arsenault v. JP Morgan Chase Bank,
N.A., 456 B.R. 627 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2011).
139. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(16) (West 2010).
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and insuring the property.140 The mortgage servicer placed notice of these
actions on the front window “prohibiting entry by anyone and stating that
it [was] protecting the property for the mortgage holder.”141
In an extended footnote, the bankruptcy court noted the lender was
the “unintended beneficiary of the perfect storm of natural disaster and
legislative inequity.”142 The court noted the HOA fees accruing against
the non-residing debtor directly benefitted the creditor through services
such as landscaping, common area maintenance, and security.143 The
ongoing arrangement resulted in an incentive for the lender “to sit idle
and not foreclose” while the borrower received little to no benefit.144
The bankruptcy court in Pigg noted the “nature of equity is the ‘correction of the law where, by reason of its universality, it is deficient.’ . . . ‘[E]quity will never suffer a wrong without a remedy.”’145 The
Pigg court ordered the trustee to sell the property and thereafter, any
remaining charges against the debtor to be discharged.146 In resolving the
question of whether the court had the authority to order the sale free and
clear of liens, it found the lender and HOA to have consented to the sale
through inaction – noting favorably that debtor had pleaded for action
and offered a deed in lieu of foreclosure.147 “The court fashion[ed] this
remedy in order to do complete justice.”148 Lastly, it should be noted the
court granted equitable relief even though the property retained considerable value.149
While successful in Pigg, similar equitable claims in different jurisdictions have not been as successful. The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of Georgia held that bankruptcy courts’ ability to utilize
equitable remedies “is constrained by the provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code,”150 and that the code “does not authorize the bankruptcy courts to
create substantive rights that are otherwise unavailable under applicable
law, or constitute a roving commission to do equity.”151 Similarly, the U.S.

140. Pigg, 453 B.R. 728, 731.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 732 n.5.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 735 (citing Aristotle, 384–322 BC.; May v. Carlton, 245 S.W.3d 340
(Tenn. 2008)).
146. Id. at 735–736.
147. Id. at 736.
148. Id. at 737.
149. Id. at 731 (noting the debtor valued the property at $55,000).
150. In re Arsenault v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 456 B.R. 627, 631 (Bankr.
S.D. Ga. 2011).
151. Id.
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Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah concluded that it lacked the
equitable power to approve a sale free of the liens without the creditor’s
consent.152
In In re Fristoe,153 the bankruptcy court found that the equitable
remedy sought was inconsistent with §§ 362 and 363 of the Bankruptcy
Code.154 The court noted the sale would contravene § 362 as the trustee
had not abandoned the properties, the creditor had not sought relief from
stay, and the properties were still part of the estate. Furthermore, the
court concluded that a sale free and clear would contravene § 363 as, although the debtor argued that the lender had breached its duty of good
faith and fair dealing, the lender had not given its consent to such a
sale.155 Although the court noted that “Congress may not have been able
to foresee that lenders would have an incentive to stall foreclosure proceedings for substantial periods of time,” such a problem is “an issue for
Congress, not this Court, to remedy.”156
C. National Mortgage Settlement
The National Mortgage Settlement (the “Settlement”) reached in
2012 between mortgage lenders and state attorneys general was a $25
billion dollar settlement aimed at preventing new foreclosures and compensating victims for improper or illegal foreclosure tactics such as robosignings.157 The Settlement contained many positive aspects such as encouraging additional negotiations between lenders and borrowers, lower
borrowing rates, preventing robo-signing, potentially lowering the
amount of principal owed, principal forbearance for unemployed borrowers, and blight-reduction programs among others.158 That being said, the

152. In re Fristoe, No. 10–32887, 2012 WL 4483891, at *3 (Bankr. D. Ut. Sept. 27,
2012).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at *4 (providing the court specifically disagreed with the Pigg court’s conclusion that it could force a creditor or find a creditor to have consented to a sale free
and clear through inaction).
157. Nat’l Ass’n. of Att’ys Gen., State Attorneys General, Feds Reach $25 Billion
Settlement with Five Largest Mortgage Servicers on Foreclosure Wrongs, NAAG NEWS
(last visited Oct. 12, 2014), http://naag.org/state-attorneys-general-feds-reach-25-bil
lion-settlement-with-five-largest-mortgage-servicers-on-foreclosure-wrongs.php.
158. Id.
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Settlement does not appear to cover the issue of zombie mortgages or
provide any framework under which the parties would need to act.159
III. SOLUTIONS
As several courts have noted, zombie mortgages appear to be a
wrong for which no readily identified or purposefully created remedy exists.160 With that landscape, the borrower retains few options other than
shoehorning claims into atypical settings or seeking legislative reform. It
appears that the best option for the shoehorn approach will originate in
bankruptcy, which may initially preclude some borrowers from seeking
that type of relief. On the other hand, legislative reform is its own wildcard. While legislative reform is often proposed in law review articles and
is the crutch of the academics seeking “impact,” the reality is that little
reform tends to come from such pieces. I believe, however, that the circumstances regarding zombie mortgages are sufficiently different that
such reform is not only possible, but in fact likely in at least a few jurisdictions. The primary reason is the alignment of interests between the homeowners and the municipalities that are already combating similar types of
issues through maintenance obligations and VPROs. With lawmakers and
homeowners having nearly perfectly aligned interests in reducing the
amount of time a property is vacant or abandoned, the opportunity for
mutually beneficial legislation is strong.
A. Solutions for the Borrower in Bankruptcy – A Jurisdictionally
Dependent Option
As noted in Section II.B.2 above, one potential judicial route for
owners seeking to escape a zombie mortgage is found in bankruptcy.161
While extended description is beyond the purview of this article, there
are generally two types of bankruptcy available to consumers. Chapter 7,
the “straight bankruptcy,” discharges debt in exchange for surrendering
non-exempt property, and is by far the most common type of bankruptcy

159. The monitor of the National Mortgage Settlement has stated that “[t]o [his]
knowledge, the servicers’ behavior [in refusing to foreclose] . . . is not covered by any
standards in the Settlement.” Conlin, supra note 16.
160. Compare id. (quoting various judges and their views on zombie mortgages
from a judicial standpoint), with Pianka, supra note 6 (defining zombie mortgages and
titles and the limited judicial remedies currently available).
161. Non-judicial alternatives such as deeds in lieu of foreclose continue to succeed
on a limited basis when the property retains value. See infra Part III.C.

R
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in the United States.162 Chapter 13 is a reorganization plan and period
that grants the debtor the opportunity to create a plan of up to five years
in which to repay past-due and current obligations and discharge
others.163 While a Chapter 7 bankruptcy allows for complete discharge of
most debt, subject to the lifting of the automatic stay it will not affect a
lender’s ability to foreclose on the property.164 Chapter 13 cases would
potentially allow the homeowner to keep the property provided he/she
meets the ongoing financial obligations.165
The automatic stay is less important in zombie mortgage cases given
that zombie mortgage cases are predicated on the fact that foreclosure
proceedings are not imminent. However, by initiating a bankruptcy proceeding, the debtor has a judicial forum in which to argue two primary
claims166 in order to escape the mortgage: surrender of property and equity. The approach has some initial appeal, especially in those jurisdictions that have focused on the equities and the debtor’s inability to
receive a “fresh start,” though the decisions cited below have also been
criticized in other courts.
The leading case for escaping post-petition HOA fees in a zombie
mortgage setting is In re Pigg discussed in Section II.B.2 above.167 The
debtor in Pigg sought relief in a Chapter 7 setting meaning she was attempting to completely discharge her debt obligations including HOA
fees that arose after the Chapter 7 proceeding.168 In Pigg, the bankruptcy
court highlighted several factors that appeared dispositive in its decision
to utilize its equitable powers including the debtor’s surrender of the
property, the creditor’s securing the property even to the exclusion of the
debtor, and the fact that on-going HOA fees continue to accrue to the
162. Div. for Pub. Educ., “Straight” Bankruptcy: Chapter 7, ABA, http://www
.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/resources/law_issues_for_consumers/bankruptcy7.html (last visited July 29, 2013).
163. Div. for Pub. Educ., Chapter 13 Bankruptcy, ABA, http://www.americanbar
.org/groups/public_education/resources/law_issues_for_consumers/bankruptcy13_
whatis.html (last visited July 29, 2013).
164. Stephen Elias, Chapter 7 Bankruptcy and Foreclosure, NOLO: LAW FOR ALL,
http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/home-chapter-7-bankruptcy-32498-2.html
(last visited July 29, 2013).
165. Div. for Pub. Educ., supra note 163.
166. In chapter 13 cases, in limited circumstances a strip down would decrease the
lender’s secured claim to the actual value of the collateral, voiding the lien to the
extent it exceeds that value. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2005). This remedy is not applicable
in chapter 7 cases, and is very limited in chapter 13 cases as it generally will not apply
to a borrower’s principal residence. Id. at § 506(a).
167. Pigg v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, (In re Pigg), 453 B.R. 728, 732 (Bankr.
M.D. Tenn. 2011).
168. Id.
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benefit of the creditor, which removes any incentive for foreclosure.169 As
noted in Section II.B.2., the bankruptcy court utilized § 363(f) of the
Code to permit a sale free and clear of any interest in the property,
though it was only able to do so by holding that the lender and HOA
were deemed to “have consented to the sale by their inaction.”170
Similar to Pigg though in a Chapter 13 setting, In re Colon also involved a debtor attempting to escape post-petition HOA fees.171 The specific law regarding postpetition HOA fees specifically applies only to
Chapter 7 cases,172 which therefore necessitates different analysis depending on the debtor’s elected pathway. In Colon, the court held that the
postpetition HOA fees were properly dischargeable in a Chapter 13
plan.173 The Colon court, as did the Pigg court, noted favorably that the
debtor had already vacated the property and surrendered all rights in the
property to the lienholder.174 Furthermore, the court had already granted
relief from the automatic stay to the creditor although the creditor then
refused to foreclose.175 Finally, in assessing the equities, the Colon court
noted that none of the benefits of the HOA fees in question accrued to
the benefit of the debtor.176
In re Perry is a somewhat similar decision that emerged at roughly
the same time as the Colon case and also in a Chapter 13 context.177 Perry
ostensibly stands for the generally accepted proposition that a creditor
cannot be forced into accepting surrendered collateral or be required to
foreclose. However, the Perry court, citing time constraints, entered an
order requiring the creditor to timely foreclosure or be forced to accept a
quitclaim deed.178 Though the record is slim, it appears that in Perry the
creditor failed to respond to the debtor’s motion for an order approving
the surrender of the property.179 In that setting, the court granted the
lender 60 days in which to commence the foreclosure, or, failing that, the
debtor would be authorized to record a title conveyance to the lender via

169. Id. at 732–33.
170. Id. at 736. The court noted that while most cases would not merit deemed
consent, given the lender’s inaction, the debtor’s surrender of the property and offer
of a deed in lieu the court believed the equities lay in favor of a fresh start for the
debtor. Id. at 735.
171. 465 B.R. 657 (Bankr. D. Utah 2011).
172. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(16) (West 2005).
173. 465 B.R. at 661–663.
174. Id. at 663.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. In re Perry, 2012 WL 4795675 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2012).
178. Id. at *2.
179. Id. at *1.
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quitclaim deed.180 It may be that the lender was willing to initiate to the
foreclosure proceeding regardless, in which case this decision would not
be as important to those debtors facing zombie mortgages. However, in
the event the lender opposed foreclosing, the debtor appears to have
found an avenue to be able to force the creditor to accept the quitclaim
deed and have it recorded.181
To the extent the Pigg, Colon, and Perry cases represent successes
for debtors challenging zombie mortgages in bankruptcy (especially in
the context of HOA fees), other cases have come out exactly opposite. In
re Fristoe, discussed in Section II.B.2 above, specifically declined to follow the reasoning in Colon (while also specifically noting the differing
contexts of Fristoe being a Chapter 7 case and Colon a Chapter 13
case).182 Likewise, the Fristoe court criticized the Pigg decision as being
“in direct contravention of the Bankruptcy Code.”183 In In re
Langenderfer, as in Fristoe, relying on § 523(a)(16), the court held a
Chapter 7 debtor liable for all postpetition HOA fees until such time as
the real property was sold at a sheriff’s sale and title transferred out of
the debtor’s name.184 Even with more favorable statutory language in the
Chapter 13 setting, the issue is not free from conflict.
The district court in the Eastern District of Michigan held in the
case of In re Spencer that the rationale behind Chapter 7 exceptions regarding the nondischargeability of postpetition HOA fees applied equally
in Chapter 13 cases.185 The court so held even though § 523(a)(16) exceptions relating specifically to HOA fees are not included in §1328(a) (the
statutory section for a Chapter 13 discharge of debt with a completed
payment plan).186 The court’s conclusion was ultimately not based on
§ 523, but rather on whether an HOA claim is a pre or postpetition claim.
The court held that, in Michigan at least, HOA fees are covenants that
run with the land.187 As a covenant running with the land, the court found
the recurring debt originated postpetition, and the debtor could unilaterally avoid the HOA debt at any time by divesting its ownership interest –
though it noted somewhat paradoxically that the debtor’s continued own-

180. Id. at *2.
181. Id.
182. In re Fristoe, 2012 WL 4483891 at n.6 (Bankr. D. Utah 2012) (noting, “to the
extent this decision is inconsistent with Colon, Colon is found to be non-persuasive
and the Court elects not to follow that reasoning”).
183. Id. at *4.
184. In re Langenderfer, 2012 WL 1414301 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2012).
185. In re Spencer, 457 B.R. 601 (E.D. Mich. 2011).
186. Id.; 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a), 1328(a).
187. Spencer, 457 B.R. at 611.
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ership of the property “[was] not by choice, apparently, but rather as a
result of the upside down nature of his mortgages . . . .”188
Even in Spencer, however, the court recognized that bankruptcy
courts may have the ability to require lenders to accept a surrender of the
affected property in certain circumstances.189 Strategically, in order to
avail itself of the court’s equity power, the debtor should surrender the
property and relinquish possession, including potentially offering a deed
in lieu of foreclosure.190 In short, Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 bankruptcies
may provide debtors a judicial avenue of relief from zombie mortgages
based on the inherent equitable powers of the court depending on the
jurisdiction.
B. Municipally Created Solutions – VPROs are Only a Starting Point
VPROs are a decent starting point for a municipality beginning to
address the vacant/abandoned property situation. However, given the
prevalence of zombie mortgages, it is clear the ordinances, while serving
as a statistical tool, have not been entirely effective.191 Based in part on
the maintenance obligations under its VPRO, Los Angeles aggressively
pursued Deutsche Bank, threatening penalties of $2,500 per day per violation.192 While this litigation and other similar lawsuits resulted in
favorable settlements for the cities involved, they do nothing to address
owners affected by zombie mortgages. States and/or cities (depending on
the proposal) should adopt one of the following two proposals as
standalone regulations or to supplement their existing VPROs or foreclosure statutes: notice of failure to foreclose, or foreclosure or else.
1. Notice of Failure to Foreclose
Of the two proposals, this one is likely to be the easier to implement
in terms of transaction costs and political opposition, and, as a direct result, is probably fairly characterized as more pro-lender in that it more
closely follows current law regarding lien priority and lenders’ foreclosure
rights and obligations. The proposal is simple and would require two essential elements: 1) a notice of intent to desist in the foreclosure process;

188. Id. at 604.
189. Id. at 615.
190. See, e.g., id. at 614-15; In re Canning, 442 B.R. 165, 171 (Bankr. D. Me. 2011);
In re Cormier, 434 B.R. 222, 232-33 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2010).
191. Georgia law, for example, only requires banks to register vacant properties
after foreclosure is completed. See Conlin, supra note 16.
192. Edvard Pettersson, Deutsche Bank Must Face Los Angeles Slumlord Claim
Suit, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 24, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-24/
deutsche-bank-must-face-los-angeles-suit-over-slumlord-claim-1-.html.
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and 2) some period of time following the notice during which the lender
would be unable to reinitiate foreclosure proceedings.
The proposal would not alter the lien priority, would not force the
lender to foreclose and discharge its lien, and would at most inconvenience the lender only if circumstances changed rapidly and the lender
sought again to initiate foreclosure proceedings. Both elements are necessary to this proposal in order for it to work equitably as designed. The
time period in the second element does not have to be overly long, but it
should be of sufficient length to allow homeowners the opportunity to
assess their legal options and determine the current state of affairs regarding the property. It would also prevent additional information
problems from developing if the owner were to receive multiple notices
of foreclosure in a shortened time period with conflicting dates.
Notice will solve many of the problems regarding those owners who
were, or claimed to be, unaware of the fact their property continued to be
listed in their name. Furthermore, information regarding lenders’ ability
to unilaterally halt the foreclosure process at any time should be required
in the initial notice to foreclose, and in that notice, the lender should
direct the owner to provide contact information at which the lender could
advise the owner of the change of circumstance in the event the owner
quits the premises.
This proposal would be a minimalist approach that incrementally
increases lenders’ obligations in foreclosures in terms of time and transaction costs, and would not resolve the underlying problem of owners unable to escape their mortgages. It would be a marginal improvement over
the current legal landscape as it would provide greater knowledge of the
foreclosure process so that individuals were not caught unaware of their
continued ownership of the property and suddenly finding themselves
subject to fines, tax liens, and even imprisonment.193 This proposal will
certainly be more palatable to lenders, but the municipalities and especially the homeowners may seek greater change.

193. See, e.g., Mem. & Aff. for Petitioner at 18, New York v. HSBC Bank, No.
2013-1660, 2013 WL 2409007 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 31, 2013) (discussing N.Y. legislation, CPLR § 3408, which would require lenders to give notice of foreclosure ninety
days prior, which notice is to include information about the foreclosure process and
possible remedies. When borrowers are unaware of foreclosure remedies, expenses
such as taxes, interest, fines, and other miscellaneous fees, are allowed to accrue,
often to unmanageable levels, frustrating the settlement process.); see also Conlin,
supra note 16.
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2. Foreclose or Else
The second proposal would take as a starting point the notice requirement in the first proposal above. Lenders initiating foreclosure proceedings would be required to notify the owners of their unilateral right
to cease the foreclosure process at any time in their initial foreclosure
notice. If in fact, lenders were to halt the foreclosure process, notice
would likewise be required. However, in addition to the notice requirements, following a certain time period after the cessation of the foreclosure (e.g., two years) the lien would be statutorily stripped from the
property if a second foreclosure were not initiated and subsequently completed in due course.194 Initially, such a proposal sounds harsh and, to the
extent the first proposal was pro-lender, this proposal is certainly proborrower. On closer inspection, however, the proposal would likely result
in minimal loss to lenders, considerably fewer zombie mortgages, real solutions for affected homeowners, and greater certainty in the
marketplace.
As mentioned above, failure to initiate a second foreclosure proceeding within the two year example would result in the lender losing its
lien on the property. Anytime someone writes in a proposal the phrase
“would result in the lender losing its lien on the property” it is safe to
assume there will be significant opposition to the proposal. However, in
the real world how likely would a lender be to suffer this consequence?
No one is saying that the lender would be forced to foreclose on the collateral securing the money owed them, and, in fact, the proposal would
make lenders act with considerably more care in both foreclosure
proceedings.
If the lender knew it had a two-strike rule, and that the time frame
of the entire process was constrained to twenty-four months, the most
likely outcome is that the lender would be much more cautious in initiating foreclosures in the first place, and would likely only do so in those
cases they believed they would in fact see the foreclosure through. Second, even if the lender decided to halt the foreclosure, it would still have
twenty-four months from that date in which to initiate a second foreclosure. Only after the time period had lapsed, or the second foreclosure
been halted, would the lender face financial repercussions.
194. A similar program was proposed in Ohio in 2011, though apparently the bill
died in committee. H.B. 56, 129th Geb. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (Oh. 2011-2012). The bill
would have required banks to transfer the lien to the county or land bank. H.B. 56,
129th Geb. Assemb., Reg. Sess., at § 2308.06(B), (C)(Oh. 2011-2012). See Joanne
Huist Smith & Lynn Hulsey, Many owners of abandoned homes escape responsibility,
DAYTON DAILY NEWS (June 30, 2012, 8:24 p.m.), http://www.daytondailynews.com/
news/news/local/many-owners-of-abandoned-homes-escape-responsibili/nPwRY/.
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This proposal should be appealing to the affected states, municipalities and homeowners as one outcome should be that fewer zombie mortgages are brought to life in the first place. With fewer zombie mortgages,
there should be fewer abandoned and vacant homes in need of maintenance, and hopefully a more robust tax base. So long as the homeowner
owns the property, the obligation to pay property taxes continues. Even if
homeowners have stopped making their mortgage payments, they may
continue to pay their tax obligations to avoid any resulting tax liens.
Finally, to the extent that the nuclear option of lien stripping were to
be used, it is likely to occur only in those situations where the property
has little or no market value, or in those cities already facing a glut of
similar properties. Stripping the lien would allow as near a clean escape
for the affected homeowner/borrower as possible given ongoing property
tax and maintenance issues.
Whereas the first proposal was modest, this one would require significant changes to a state’s foreclosure laws. By making the proposal a
statewide proposal, the overwhelming support for VPROs and similar ordinances that may be found in municipalities facing crippling vacancy
problems may not be shared by the rest of the state. In addition, lenders,
although preferring statewide solutions for uniformity, have had significant success in lobbying to reduce requirements and obligations states
had sought to impose on them through VPRO type legislation.
3. Home Foreclosure Procedures Act
A drafting committee of the Uniform Law Commission (ULC), also
known as the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws (NCCUSL) has been working since 2012 on proposed legislation to
regulate residential mortgage foreclosures.195 The proposal is in the drafting stage, but contains several proposals similar to those suggested above
in the case of abandoned property.196 For the purposes of this article, the
sections on abandoned property of most interest relate to the foreclosure
process and maintenance obligations.197 The proposal would create a legal
presumption of abandonment when a certain minimum of indicia exist.198

195. Report of the January 13 Stakeholder meeting and the January 14 meeting of
the Study Committee Regarding a Uniform Mortgage Foreclosure Procedures Act,
UNIFORMLAWS.ORG (July 2011), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/mortgage%
20foreclosure/2012may_RREMFPP_Report%20to%20Scope_FINAL.pdf.
196. HOME FORECLOSURE PROCEDURES ACT §§ 601–6 (Meeting Draft Nov. 6,
2014).
197. Id.
198. Id. at § 601(a)(1)–(8) (noting the presumption of abandonment would apply
in the event that at least three of the eight conditions had been satisfied).
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The proposed law would allow either the plaintiff creditor or a governmental subdivision to move for or seek a determination of abandonment
depending on the type of proceeding.199
Once a property is determined abandoned under the proposed legislation, a streamlined foreclosure process is to commence.200 Under the
streamlined approach, the foreclosure sale should occur between 30 and
60 days of entry of the public sale order depending on the procedure
utilized.201 If, however, the court in a judicial foreclosure proceeding finds
there is insufficient equity in the property to satisfy the interests of junior
creditors, the court would order the transfer of the property to the creditor without public sale, and, upon transfer, all junior liens would be extinguished.202 One of the key components of this statute is that once a
property is determined abandoned, the creditor or servicer must see that
the foreclosure is completed within a reasonable time unless it is willing
to release its mortgage and file that release with the proper register.203
Under this section, the creditor would not be able to avoid maintenance
obligations on the property by dismissing or terminating the foreclosure
proceeding, but only by releasing its mortgage.204
In the Drafters’ Notes following the section, the drafters stated their
attempt to reconcile the differing preferences of the creditors, debtors
and municipalities “by offering the lender a choice of how it wishes to
proceed.”205 While not as draconian in its approach as requiring a relinquishment of the mortgage or outright prohibiting multiple bites at the
foreclosure process apple, the proposal would unquestionably impose affirmative obligations of maintenance on the lender similar to what many
municipalities have attempted through VPROs.206 The maintenance obligation would only be triggered when the streamlined foreclosure process
is utilized with respect to the abandoned properties.207 In many cases, the
creditor will be able to control that outcome through its litigation strategy; however, as stated above, § 601 would allow the municipality to also
seek the determination of abandonment.208 In those cases, creditors
would be forced to confront the dilemma of releasing their mortgages or

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

§§ 601(b), 602.
§ 605(a).
§ 605(a), (b).
§ 605(a)(2).
§ 605(c).

at § 605, Drafters’ Notes.
at § 606.
at § 601.
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deal with ongoing maintenance obligations – exactly the outcome the municipalities and debtors are seeking.
C. Deed in Lieu to Bank / Short Sales
I include a brief mention of the deed in lieu of foreclosure and short
sale options here because, although they are rather obvious ones, it would
be an oversight to omit them. In fact, although I have only anecdotal
evidence, these two options (sometimes along with an attempt to quit
claim a deed to the lender) are among the first and last of the solutions
sought on behalf of the zombie mortgagor. They deserve brief mention
because occasionally they are successful; however, they are often of limited utility for a variety of reasons relating to short sale program qualification requirements.209
A short sale, as the name implies, requires a sale. In order for a sale
to take place, a buyer needs to appear with an offer. Clearly lenders now
are much more willing to work with owners to facilitate short sales than
they were six or even three years ago.210 However, for some properties,
whether because of the state of disrepair, the location, or a declining population base, a buyer will not appear to make an offer, or, the type of
buyer that appears is the investor looking to scoop up portfolios of
properties cheap, with no intention to rehabilitate the homes, and flip for
a quick profit.211 Cities suffer equally in the situation where the house is
abandoned or purchased by the absentee investor with no intent to renovate, though in some cases at least some tax payments may be forthcoming from the investor. Sellers should pursue short sales and propose any
such transaction to the lender as that, coupled with a lender’s refusal to

209. Home Affordable Foreclosure Alternatives (HAFA) Program, U.S. DEP’T OF
HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., http://www.makinghomeaffordable.gov/programs/exitgracefully/Pages/hafa.aspx (last visited Nov. 9, 2014); see also Wells Fargo Home Affordable Foreclosure Alternatives (HAFA) Matrix, WELLSFARGO.COM, https://www08
.wellsfargomedia.com/downloads/pdf/homeassist/hafa.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2014).
210. See Contact Your Mortgage Company, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN
DEV., http://www.makinghomeaffordable.gov/get-assistance/contact-mortgage/Pages/
default.aspx (last visited Nov. 9, 2014) (noting over 100 lenders participating in the
Making Home Affordable Program).
211. Some lenders have taken steps to prevent this by including specific provisions
within the short sale deed, such as those prohibiting sale of the property within 30
days of purchase, or sale of the property for more than 120% of the purchase price
within 90 days of purchase. See, eg., Gwen Muse-Evans, Standard Short Sale/HAFA II
and Deed-in-Lieu of Foreclosure Requirements, FANNIE MAE 13 (August 22, 2012),
https://www.fanniemae.com/content/announcement/svc1219.pdf.
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entertain the short sale, has been seen as a positive equity in bankruptcy
cases.212
The deed in lieu route and the quit claim deed route appear to be
less appealing when the property has relatively little value with which to
entice the lender to accept the deed.213 One way to potentially overcome
that resistance is to include an anti-merger clause214 that would preserve
the value of the lenders’ liens on the property, though that is unlikely to
sway a lender who is opposed to the deed because of maintenance and/or
property tax grounds. As noted, however, the main problem with using a
deed in lieu is that lenders believe they will not realize sufficient payment
for the soon to be REO property.
If the owner is able to convince the lender to accept a deed in lieu,
the owner should be careful to ensure the owner is released in writing
from any possible deficiency, and the original note should be cancelled
and returned to the owner following the filling of the deed in lieu.215 It is
also important to note that certain lenders have their own requirements
before considering a deed in lieu of foreclosure. In many cases, the lender

212. See, e.g., In re Pigg v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 453 B.R. 728, 736
(Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2011). The Making Home Affordable (MHA) program, introduced in 2009 and extended to December 31, 2013, incentives short sales in a number
of ways. For example, MHA offers relocation assistance to the owner, and cash payments to second lien holders. See also, Need to Leave Your Home?, U.S. DEP’T OF
HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT (last visited July 29, 2013), http://www.making
homeaffordable.gov/programs/exit-gracefully/Pages/default.aspx (stating availability
of $3,000 in relocation assistance). In connection with MHA, through the Home Affordable Foreclosure Alternative (HAFA) program, the federal government has succeeded in increasing the number of short sales. The programs continue to be updated,
notably through Treasury Update 10-18 and 11-08, which further facilitate short sales;
though it should be noted that institutional lenders such as Fannie Mae continue to
maintain their own requirements.
213. See JOHN C. Murray, Deeds in Lieu: Subsequent Foreclosure of Mortgage,
DIRT, 1 (2006), dirt.umkc.edu/attachments/DeedsinLieu.doc (describing lenders reluctance to accept deeds in lieu for low-value properties).
214. See generally id. (discussing anti-merger clauses in a foreclosure context).
215. Owners should also take care regarding any potential cancellation of debt income that could be taxable depending on a variety of factors including whether the
home is the primary residence, the canceled amount was legitimately contested and
doubtful, etc. See Olney Trust Bank v. Pitts, 200 Ill.App.3d 917, 924-26 (Ill. App. Ct.
1990) (noting that mortgagee may still be personally liable for mortgage debt, even
after signing a deed in lieu).
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will require an attempted short sale first,216 others require occupancy for a
stated period of time,217 and others require the home be habitable.218
D. “Quick Take” and Seizing Mortgages – Affirmative Use of Eminent
Domain
These two alternatives, quick take and mortgage seizure through
eminent domain, fall on the more exotic end of the scale and are unlikely
to apply to many zombie properties. “Quick Take” statutes are generally
those that authorize a public entity to acquire property through its powers of eminent domain in a more expeditious fashion than traditional condemnation acquisitions.219 The City of Baltimore had successfully used
quick take actions to rapidly acquire property in a procedure that provided the owner with fewer procedural defenses.220 After beginning an
aggressive program to repurchase abandoned or vacant properties in the
early 2000s, Baltimore suffered legal setbacks that provided constraints
on its ability to utilize the quick take mechanism. Following a 2007 Maryland Supreme Court ruling, it is only allowed to use its quick take power
in cases of “immediate necessity.”221 Baltimore’s Office of the Comptroller currently provides contact information for individuals wishing to donate the property to the city, and includes a brief description of the city’s
acquisition process.222

216. Wells Fargo Home Affordable Foreclosure Alternatives (HAFA) Matrix, supra
note 209.
217. See Occupancy Affidavit, JAMES B. NUTTER & COMPANY, MORTGAGE BROKERS, http://www.jamesbnutter.com/wp-content/uploads/lossmit/FHAShortSalesAndDeeds-In-LieuOfForeclosure/OccupancyAffidavit.pdf (requiring owner to attest to
occupancy of the property within last 18 months); Wells Fargo Home Affordable Foreclosure Alternatives (HAFA) Matrix, supra note 209 (noting prior requirement of occupancy for borrower and non-borrower occupant).
218. See MUSE-EVANS, supra note 211, at 3 (requiring property not be
condemned).
219. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (referring to quick-take as “quick
condemnation” or “the immediate taking of possession of private property for public
use” where compensation follows at a later date).
220. See generally, Jill Rose, Judges attack ‘quick take’, THE BALTIMORE SUN (Apr.
13, 2007), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2007-04-13/news/0704130107_1_eminentdomain-bdc-court-of-appeals.
221. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore City v. Valsamaki, 397 Md. 222, 248, 916
A.2d 324, 339 (2007).
222. See Department of Real Estate, CITY OF BALT. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER
(Oct. 8, 2014), http://www.comptroller.baltimorecity.gov/REALESTATE.html (identifying the department as the entity in charge of acquiring real property in the City of
Baltimore).
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A more radical approach is currently underway in California223
where cities are contemplating using their power of eminent domain on
the mortgages, but not the properties themselves.224 As noted in a proposal by Professor Robert Hocket of Cornell Law School,225 this plan would
allow cities to acquire underwater mortgages at present market value and
then work through a friendly third-party investor to provide the property
owners a lower cost mortgage.226 The benefits of the plan are that it could
be quickly implemented and would avoid the typical barriers to writedowns when the mortgages have been securitized, pooled and held by
specialized trusts. Structured properly, the owners and municipalities
would be the clear winners as the mortgages could be seized without any
needed cooperation from the securitization trusts, the properties remain
occupied, the owners continue paying real estate taxes, and they would
have reduced principal amounts and lower monthly payments. However,
as the municipalities and owners would benefit, the lenders would foot
the bill, either voluntarily by working with the municipality or involuntarily forced by the power of eminent domain. This type of exercise of the
power of eminent domain has been challenged in the press,227 and will
likely face legal challenges once implemented.228
The mortgage seizure route is presently extremely limited and unlikely to see widespread adoption unless and until it survives legal challenge. Further, even if it survives legal challenge, it is unlikely to be of
much help to owners of zombie properties in its current incarnation as it

223. See, e.g., CITY OF RICHMOND, CAL., Minutes for City Council (April 2, 2013)
http://www.ci.richmond.ca.us/ArchiveCenter/ViewFile/Item/5138 (approving city plan
to purchase certain mortgages affected by the mortgage crisis in order to preserve
home ownership, equity, and stabilize the community).
224. See Nick Timiraos, Cities Take Fresh Look At Mortgage Seizures, WALL ST. J.
(June 20, 2013, 7:04 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142412788732330000457
8557670146742366.html; Peter Dreier, To Rescue Local Economies, Cities Seize Underwater Mortgages Through Eminent Domain, HUFF POST (July 18, 2013, 8:20 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-dreier/to-rescue-local-economies_b_3614326
.html.
225. See generally, Robert Hocket, Paying Paul and Robbing No One: An Eminent
Domain Solution for Underwater Mortgage Debt, 19 FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. 1,
5 (2013).
226. See Timiraos, supra note 224.
227. See Editorial, The Fed’s Eminent Mistake, WALL ST. J., June 12, 2013, at A16
(disagreeing with the proposal).
228. See Peter Dreier, To Rescue Local Economies, Cities Seize Underwater Mortgages Through Eminent Domain, THE NATION (July 12, 2013), http://www.thenation
.com/article/175244/rescue-local-economies-cities-seize-underwater-mortgagesthrough-eminent-domain# (identifying threatened, costly litigation from banking and
real estate trade groups).

R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMX\45-1\NMX105.txt

Fall 2014]

unknown

Seq: 39

14-JAN-15

ZOMBIE MORTGAGES, REAL ESTATE, AND THE FALLOUT

12:42

75

is reported that it would be limited to homeowners current on their payment and without a government-backed mortgage with a likely requirement the property be occupied.229 As with the quick take route, both of
these would require affirmative city involvement in order to initiate the
eminent domain proceeding.
E. Homeowner Responsibility and Miscellaneous Remedies
At some point, the role of the homeowner also needs to be addressed in dealing with the zombie mortgages.230 In many situations, the
lack of financial resources was what occasioned the owner’s default. In
others the plummeting value of the real estate itself or the neighborhood
in which the real estate is located may have precipitated the default. In
any event, the owners are still legally responsible for the property
whether they abandoned it or not, and are simply looking for any type of
solution. Given that it is a lack of resources coupled with ownership of a
low value property that places the owner into the zombie mortgage scenario, the owner will generally lack resources to pay his/her way out of
trouble. However, the owner can provide some collaboration that could
potentially benefit the lender and municipality whether through maintaining residence of the property or transferring it to the county or land
bank in exchange for a full release of any liens.
1. Stay in the Home
One solution that is commonly recommended is for the owner to
simply stay in the home until the sheriff or a court issues eviction papers.231 The upside of remaining in the property is that it will not become
vacant and subject to additional vandalism and neglect. Additionally, provided that the owner makes the tax payments and there are no other
liens, no other party will seek to evict the owner. In that sense, the owner
can remain in the home for an extended period of time and very little
cost. In the absence of any regulatory reform as suggested in Part III.B
above, this option may be the one preferred by the owner, the municipal-

229. See Joaquin Palomino, Foreclosure Prevention Program May Not Assist Those
Most in Need, RICHMOND CONFIDENTIAL, (November 18, 2013), http://richmondconfidential.org/2013/11/18/foreclosure-prevention-program-may-not-assist-those-mostin-need/.
230. In Buffalo N.Y., for example, the prosecutor brings charges against both the
owner and lender, threatening the owner with traditional fines as well as non-monetary obligations such as community service. See Orey, supra note 65 (asserting that the
owner, as well as the lender, is responsible).
231. Tom Beres, ‘Zombie’ mortgages/titles: Foreclosure horror stories, WKYC.COM
(Apr. 24, 2013, 11:47 PM), http://www.wkyc.com/news/story.aspx?storyid=296177.
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ity and the lender in that the house remains occupied, the homeowner
ensures that the property is maintained in accordance with applicable ordinances, and the home is less likely to be subject to vandalism and other
improper use which could decrease its value further.232
2. Land Banks
Land banks, either public or private, generally obtain the majority
of their inventory after foreclosure auctions in which no bidder won the
property.233 Additionally, lenders are the largest donors of properties to
the land banks after they have foreclosed on the property and are unable
to otherwise dispose of it.234 Even though lenders are the primary sources
of property donations, owners may also be able to transfer title in their
property to a local land bank given that certain criteria are met.235 Given
the priority accorded to lenders’ liens, land banks will sometimes accept
donations with the limitation that there be no liens other than tax liens on
the property.236 Other land banks will not accept donations and instead
only acquire properties through foreclosure proceedings or governmental
or non-profit transfers which can make this option limiting.237
The benefit to the homeowner, as discussed above, is that some land
banks have the ability to cleanse a title of tax liens which can make the
program very useful in reintegrating the property back into the market232. See Conlin, supra note 16 (noting multiple cases in which the home owner’s
absence from the vacant property led to an accumulation of vandalism and code violations, resulting in a diminished property value).
233. SAGE COMPUTING, INC., Revitalizing Foreclosed Properties with Land Banks,
U.S. DEP’T. OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV. 1, 2 (2009), http://www.huduser.org/portal/
publications/landbanks.pdf; see also, HOUSINGPOLICY.ORG, http://www.housingpolicy
.org/toolbox/strategy/policies/abandoned_properties.html (last updated Sept. 04,
2012) (noting that Michigan land bank acquired majority of its holdings from tax foreclosures); Jack Spencer, Kent County Land Bank Circumvents Market to Fund Operations, CAPCON (July 30, 2013), http://www.michigancapitolconfidential.com/18931
(noting that Michigan statute prohibits land banks from acquiring properties until
after they have failed to sell at auction).
234. In at least a few jurisdictions, lenders have teamed up with the land banks and
municipalities to donate some of their low value properties with cash donations to
defray some of the costs of demolition. Wells Fargo, Bank of America donating
properties to Cuyahoga Land Bank, CUYAHOGA LAND BANK (June 28, 2011), http://
www.cuyahogalandbank.org/articles/20110628_boa_wf.php.
235. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
236. Property Donation Application, Lucas County Land Bank, http://co.lucas.oh
.us/documents/463/Property%20Donation%20Application_201401021443518955.pdf
(last accessed Nov. 9, 2013 at 5:57 p.m.) (stating that properties encumbered by liens
or other clouds of title may be denied).
237. See SAGE COMPUTING, INC., supra note 233, at 5 (noting that funds from
Neighborhood Stabilization Program were only for purchasing foreclosure property).

R
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place to the benefit of the municipality and the owner.238 For those owners that would like to donate but are unable because their lenders refuse
to foreclose, transferal of title to a land bank is an attractive option. If a
short sale and/or a deed in lieu of foreclosure have already been unsuccessfully attempted and the property retains very little worth, the lender
may be willing to relinquish its lien with the knowledge the property is
being transferred to a land bank. In that case, the transfer with the release of the lien will sever all remaining financial obligations the owner
has with the property and act, in essence, as a foreclosure. This remedy is
of course limited to those jurisdictions with land banks, and, to the extent
the lender is unwilling to foreclose, that it be at least amenable to the
possibility of transferring the land to the land bank.
CONCLUSION
Home owners affected by zombie properties have not been able to
flee the corresponding obligations as easily as those whose homes went
through the entire foreclosure process. This inability to get a fresh start
has hampered owners and municipalities alike albeit with different ends
in mind. Fortunately, borrowers seeking to escape zombie mortgages
share goals and interests with municipalities which should increase the
probability of mutually beneficial legislation. By co-opting municipal interests, borrowers are able to obtain an improved strategic position vis a
vis the lenders as the proposed solutions provide legislative relief for their
situation. Municipal ordinances or state laws that impose greater notice
obligations on the lenders, or that require lender action in a definite time
frame will represent strong steps toward alleviating the current crisis.
Barring any such change, the affected owners’ best opportunity to escape
the ongoing burden of the property may involve surrender of the property or a plea for equitable relief in bankruptcy. Yet as long as the affected properties have essentially no value, lenders will have no incentive
to accept deeds in lieu or go through a foreclosure sale. As always, the
question will be to what extent action is needed to alleviate the problem,
even when that action imposes costs on the lending community. The proposed solutions represent an opportunity for the owners and municipalities to cut losses, reduce the blight on communities, and allow all parties
to move on cleanly from zombie properties.

238. See id. at 9 (citing the Fulton County/Atlanta Land Bank as having the power
to waive tax liens and clear titles).
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